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Executive Summary
Water scarcity is becoming a major concern in most countries, not only because it threat-
ens the economic viability of current agricultural practices, but because it is likely to alter
an already precarious balance among its many types of use: human consumption, indus-
trial use, energy production, recreation, etc. Underneath this emergent situation, the crude
realities of conflict over water rights of use and the need of accurate assessment of water
needs and use become more salient than ever.
In countries like Spain, and particularly in its Mediterranean coast, there is a high
degree of public awareness of the main consequences of the scarcity of water and the need
of fostering efficient use of water resources. Two new mechanisms for water management
already under way are: a heated debate on the need and feasibility of transferring water
from one basin to another, and, directly related to this proposal, the regulation of water
banks.1
It has been sufficiently argued that more efficient uses of water may be achieved within
an institutional framework where water rights may be exchanged more freely, not only un-
der exceptional conditions but on a day to day basis [Cal06, RGL04, Tho97]. It has been
claimed that if farmers cannot sell their extra water allotment, they have no incentive to
use the allotment efficiently and it may become wasteful [HR07]. Moreover, a straightfor-
ward extension to other types of stakeholders would promote trading for industrial uses,
aquiculture, leisure or navigation, not only irrigation, thus improving market conditions
and hence efficiency of water use [Cal06]. We propose to implement such a market with a
regulated open multi-agent system, mWater, whose main features we discuss in this paper.
Our focus is on demand and, in particular, on the type of regulatory and market mech-
anisms that foster an efficient use of water while preventing conflicts.2 We are therefore
1The 2001 Water Law of the National Hidrological Plan (NHP) —’Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2001,
BOE 176’ (see www.boe.es/boe/dias/2001/07/24/pdfs/A26791-26817.pdf, in Spanish)— and its amend-
ment in 2005 regulates the power of right-holders to engage in voluntary water transfers, and of basin
authorities to setup water markets, banks, and trading centers for the exchange of water rights in cases of
drought or other severe scarcity problems.
2Considerable effort has been invested in the development of sophisticated basin simulation models and
in improvement and innovation of water use practices. Literature abounds in examples of decision support
systems for water management [RN05], sustainable planning of water volumes [CLM04, MdSODO+07],
or the use of shared visions for negotiation and conflict resolution [PWMW99]. We explore an alterna-
tive approach in which individual and collective agents are an essential component because their behavior
(and effects) may be influenced by policy-making. There are few projects along this line but one may
point to the NEGOWAT project (http://www.negowat.org/ingles/inicio/Inicio.htm), whose goal is to help
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interested in the institutional framework that defines the “rules of the game” that may al-
low one to study the role that regulation, social environment, coordination, conflict reso-
lution mechanisms, reputation or trust play in the decisions participating agents make and
their aggregate results. Ideally, the institutional framework should add flexibility to cur-
rent water use practices without increasing the number or complexity of disputes. In such
a framework we shall profit from agreement technologies to understand the behaviour of
participating agents and the collective effects of their behavior.
The following is a sketch of four study themes that, we believe, make the mWater
framework a fertile case-study for the testing and development of agreement technologies.
A regulated environment The mWater scenario requires the expression and use of reg-
ulations of different sorts: from actual laws and regulations issued by governments,
to policies and local regulations issued by basin managers, to social norms that
prevail in a given community of users. Some will be regimented as part of the
electronic institutional framework specification, but others need to be expressed in
a declarative form so that one may reason about them, both off- and on-line, both
at design and at run time, and both from the institutional (or legislative) perspec-
tive and the agent’s individual perspective. Issues that are relevant in this respect
range from the choice of expressive formalism to the decision-making strategies
that agents might use to comply or disobey regulations. Thus, structural aspects
like governance, dynamics of norms (also from the legislative and execution per-
spectives) as well as criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of norms may and need to
be explored in the demonstrator.
Organizational and collective interaction There are good opportunities to study the in-
terplay between formal institutional aspects (laws, ontologies and sanctioned prac-
tices), the organizations that enforce or should abide by them and the individuals
that form those organizations or participate in the regulated activities. Also, the
scenario involves collective actors that may not only have their own social rules for
allocating rights and solving conflicts but also become involved in negotiation as
collective entities. That is the case, for instance, of the “comunidades de regantes”
(agricultural users assocs.) who interact with a municipal government or a power
plant to negotiate transfers of rights, or as plaintiffs or defendants in conflicts over
the use of water. Once again there is the possibility of studying organizational and
institutional dynamics, the way rules become internalized by individuals and the
emergence of collective norms. These matters suggest also the opportunity to study
collective decision-making, judgement aggregation and other formal and informal
ways of social choice. Finally, given the rich sociological content of water use,
the scenario should provide enough empirical grounds for playing with notions like
trust and reputation, moral authority, power and force that are crucial in practice but
have not been thoroughly studied in a MAS context, yet.
negotiations between stakeholders in peri-urban catchment areas when water conflicts arise. Closer to our
own approach, the recent effort is project MAELIA (http://www.iaai-maelia.eu), that involves simulation of
socio-environmental impact of norms for water and other renewable natural resources and the environment.
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Structured and spontaneous conflict A significant part of the proposed framework in-
volves the specification of valid negotiation protocols, as we will see below, and
therefore the possibility of studying negotiation heuristics, agent architectures adapted
to those negotiation capabilities on one side, and on the other the systematic study
of the negotiation conventions themselves. Moreover, the framework includes a
space —what we call agreement management— where once an agreement for the
transfer of water rights has been reached, contracts are negotiated and executed and
agreements and contracts may be contested. While the general process for agree-
ment management is properly regulated, the idea is to leave enough flexibility in
the institutional framework so that the general idea of an agent managed contract
may be explored in earnest. Likewise, those structured interactions that happen af-
ter trading rights are excellent brewing environments to study conflicts (detonators,
structure and types) and conflict resolution; in particular, the possibility of using
and devising non-conventional forms of on-line dispute resolution.
Simulation environment The engineering of the demonstrator requires sophisticated soft-
ware tools for specification,construction, testing and monitoring of the on-line mar-
ket and the participating agents. We plan to attach simulation services to the elec-
tronic institution infrastructure along the lines of [ANRAS07] and thus facilitate
the coupling of mWater as a water use module of sophisticated basin simulators for
water use policy purposes. Another outcome we foresee is the use of our demon-
strator as a proof-of-concept prototype for the actual water banks (and banks for
other natural resources) envisaged in current legislation.
As a whole, mWater constitutes a rather complex regulated open multi-agent system.
The work we report in this deliverable provides the problem specification, and the analysis
and design of the institutional framework for mWater prototype #1. We are now devel-
oping a richer electronic institution where scenes of the trading tables and the agreement
management performative structures will be tailored to the two sources of inspiration of
the demonstrator: i) to interaction conventions that are interesting for the testing of ideas
developed in other work packages of the AT project, and ii) to interaction conventions
that correspond to current practices and legislation. In this process we also improve the
social structure of the framework to include specific staff roles for trading and conflict
resolution mechanisms, auctioneers, arbiters, mediators, facilitators; as well as collective
actors. Evidently, the ontology will need to be enriched and we shall begin to deal with
the problems of anchoring dialogical terms (i.e. establishing the pragmatics of constants
and relations in the communication language).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It has been said that clean fresh water will be the ”gold” of the 21st century [HR07]. Only
3% of the Earth’s water is salt free. Of that 3%, approximately 2.7% is frozen in polar ice
caps or deep underground. This leaves only 0.3% of all the water on the planet available
for human use [Gle96, Pan07]. Water scarcity is especially problematic in dry climates
such as the Mediterranean. Spain suffers from severe water shortages [HR07].
Countries in arid climates need to find better ways to manage their water. In the next
century, growth in urban water use and climate change will stress existing water supplies.
Inefficiency and waste are luxuries that water scarce regions can no longer afford. Many
attribute inefficient water use to command-and-control policies that dictate water alloca-
tions to competing interests. These alleged inefficiencies have led to an exploration of
market based policies, including water trading, to increase efficient water use.
In this chapter we describe the normative and policy framework of the water man-
agement problem in Spain. The description includes an overview of the different Water
Laws that regulate the water management and distribution, paying special attention on the
transfer of Water-Rights, Water Markets and their regulation. Finally the Aquifer of the
Mancha Oriental is discussed in detail.
1.1 Water management and distribution in Spain
Spain’s water policy has changed dramatically in the last twenty years. This rapid evolu-
tion has been accompanied by growing water problems. As pointed out by Garrido and
Llamas [GL07], the key drivers of change include environmental degradation, growing
water demand, climatic change, agricultural policy and economic growth. Consequently,
Spain needs to improve its water management to meet the rising demand and decreasing
supply of the future. Demand is driven by urban growth in major cities and the burgeoning
coastal areas.
While the new demand for water comes from urban and coastal areas, the bulk of
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Spain’s water still goes to crop irrigation. The Spanish Ministry of the Environment
and Rural and Marine Affair (formerly the Ministry of Agriculture) estimates that Spain
dedicates 70-80% of its water to agriculture.
Spain water policy uses traditional forms of water management, which often allocate
water through a politically negotiated process or command-and-control. But it also allows
water rights transfer to equal or higher priority right holders (1985 Water Law). The
following sections reviews the different Spain’s water laws, beginning in 1985, and ending
in 2007. The content of these sections are transcribed from [GL07] and the ”Real Decreto
Legislativo 1/200, BOE 176” (Water Law of the National Hidrological Plan).
1.1.1 The 1985 Water Law and 1999 Water Law reform
The 1985 Water Law opened a new era for water policy for a number of reasons: (i)
water resources were considered public domain, saving a few exceptions of groundwater
use; (ii) it laid down water planning principles that eventually would be materialised in
three failed attempts of national hydrological plans; (iii) it consolidated a financial regime
for water users which delivered them important benefits, the irrigators being the most
favoured; (iv) it consolidated the institutional role of the Basin Agencies, granting them
autonomy, financial resources and personnel to become the actual decision makers in all
issues within the basin boundaries; lastly, (v) it defined a model of co-decision making
in which direct water users and interested administrations have had an active role in all
water planning and management at basin level.
The 1999 Water Law reform amended the 1985 Water Law, changing three funda-
mental issues. First, it was the regulation of the exchange of water rights, permitting
right-holders to engage in voluntary water transfers and the Basin Authorities (Organis-
mos de Cuenca) to setup water banks or trading centers in cases of droughts or of severe
scarcity problems. Second, it focused on the creation of public corporations in building
water works and recouping the costs by means of sounder financial arrangements. Third,
a crucial, thought subtle, consideration of desalinated and reused water as belonging to
the public domain, on equal level to other water sources, and the issuance of special water
rights granted to its users. The first issue was clearly the most controversial.
1.1.2 The 2001 and 2004 Laws of the National Hydrological Plan
These two laws approved and repealed a major inter-basin water transfer project, the
so called Ebro water transfer. While many other initiatives approved in the 2001 NHP
(National Hydrological Plan) were maintained in the 2004 NHP and have already been
partially implemented, the Ebro transfer epitomizes the breakdown of consensus of a
century-old mode of thinking, planning and executing water policies.
As recent as in 2007, the approval of the reform of the Autonomous Statutes of Catalo-
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Figure 1.1: Basin Organism organizational structure
nia, Andalucia, Aragon and Valencia consolidated the power of the regional governments
on water affairs.
The NHP defines the management structure of the Spain Water policy. Some relevant
articles are the followings:
Article 15 of 2001 NHP defines a Hydrographic Basin as the territory in which the
water flows to the sea through a network of secondary channels that converge into a unique
main channel. The Hydrographic Basin as a water management unit is atomic.
Article 19 of 2001 NHP defines the National Water Council as the higher consulting
organism on water subjects. The National Water Council is made up of the Government
Administration, the Autonomous Communities, the local entities, the basin authorities,
and the most representative professional and economic organisms related with water us-
ages.
Article 21 of 2001 NHP states that a Basin Organism is constituted in the Hydro-
graphic Basins that exceeds the territory of an Autonomous Community.
Among the duties of a Basin Organism is (Article 24) the ”... execution ... of plans,
programs and actions with the goal of an adequate management of the water requests, in
order to promote saving and socio-economical efficiency in the different water usages ...”
The Basin Organizational Structure as depicted in Figure 1.1. A Basin Organism or
Hydrographic Federation is composed of three main boards. The Governance board of the
Basin Organism (Article 26) is made up of the Governance Committee and the President.
The Management board is made up of the User Assembly, the Reservoir Commission,
the Exploitation Assembly and the Building Work Assembly. The Planning board is the
Basin Water Council.
Article 54 states that the pluvial waters that flow over a property can be legally used
by the owner. At the same time the spring waters can be also used by the property owner
whenever this usage are less than 70.000 cubic meters.
Article 59 on the water right granting states that every privative use of water that is
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not included in Article 54 is subject to administrative granting. The concessions will be
granted taking into account the rational use of ground and underground water. Every
concession will be granted following the NPH, it is for a finite period of time and not
longer than 75 years.
Article 60 on the preference ordering for water usage. A preference ordering should
be defined in every Basin Hydrological Plan. Every concession is subject to unavoidable
expropriation, in favor of other use that precedes it in the order defined by the Basin
Hydrological Plan. In the absence of this order the following will apply:
1. Human water supply and reduced-consumption industries
2. Irrigation / agricultural sectors
3. Industrial usage for energy supply
4. Other industrial uses not included above
5. Aquiculture
6. Leisure uses
7. Navigation and aquatic transportation
8. Other uses
The water right or water concession can be transferred among right-holders. The
following section focuses on its regulation and its properties.
1.1.3 Water Right Transfer in Spain
The NHP regulates the water right transfer defining the transfer agreement features and
effects. Tradable water rights are rights to use water that can be transferred all or in part,
separately from the transfer of land [RR94]. Proponents of water trading also emphasize
the importance of property rights since markets can only work when these rights are
clearly established [Pan07]. The lack of tradable rights has been cited as a primary source
of inefficiency in water markets. If a farmer cannot sell their extra water allotment of
water, (s)he has no incentive to use the existing allotment efficiently and it may become
wasteful [HR07].
Article 67 of NHP states that any water right-holder can temporarily transfer to other
right-holder of the same or higher preference order in the Basin Hydrological Plan (or
NHP), obtaining previously an administrative authorization. The preference ordering
could not be applied when there is an exceptional situation and it is authorized by the
Ministry of Environment.
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The water right transfer agreements must be signed and submitted to the Basin Or-
ganism and the User Assembly within 15 days (Article 68). The Basin Organism has one
month to answer it. If the Organism do not reply to the agreement within one or two
month (for right-holders of the same basin, or from different basins, respectively) it is
considered authorized.
Article 69 states that the water right transfer can have an associated economic compen-
sation. The amount will be agreed between the negotiating parties and must be included
in the right transfer agreement. The Basin Organism can regulate a maximum amount for
economic compensations. Water banks or trading centers are defined in Article 71.
Although the Water Law reform opened the era of water markets in 1999, the first
experiences took almost seven years to occur. The Law opened two routes to enable right-
holders to lease out their rights either to basin authorities or to another user. The simplest
way just takes an agreement of two right-holders and their decision to file a permission to
formally exchange the right. Very few, albeit significant, exchanges have been reported.
Spain has implemented smaller scale water trading schemes. Take for example, the
Irrigation Subscribers Association of the Riudecanyes Reservoir which has traded water
rights among its members for decades. Located in the northeastern region of Catalonia,
the Association was founded in 1904 when they gained a water concession from the Span-
ish Government. With 10% privately raised capital, they constructed a dam and channel
to irrigate their fields. The remaining funds came as a subsidy from the Spanish govern-
ment.1 As part of the concession agreement 2/3 of the water was to be used for irrigation
and the remaining 1/3 was for municipal water use for the city of Reus. From the out-
set, the members of the association were allowed to temporarily or permanently sell their
water rights to other members of the association. With not enough water to irrigate ev-
ery agricultural plot, the water trading scheme generated incentives for efficient water
use, movement to the production of more valuable crops and increased flexible produc-
tion. This case presents an interesting institutional arrangement that suggests that water
trading can be successfully implemented even when the State still owns the water. In
this case, the Association owned the concession but then allowed for usufruct rights to
be traded among its members [MK99]. The successful features of this water trading in-
cluded: the existence of a user-based management approach; water use rights that were
well defined, measurable and enforceable; and adequate knowledge about the amount of
water available for trading [MK99].
While economists overwhelming agree that water trading can create efficiency im-
provements, very few countries have actually implemented such policies [CG06]. Only
Australia, the United States and Chile are consistently cited as success stories. This sug-
gests that large obstacles to implement water trading have not yet been overcome. These
obstacles include [HR07]:
• transaction and infrastructure costs,
• equity considerations,
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• distributing water rights among users,
• demand feedbacks effects,
• and drought management issues [Pan07].
Proponents of tradable water rights argue that command-and-control policies are in-
efficient mechanisms to allocate water resources. Resources are inefficiently distributed
when they can be reallocated to improve social welfare. Economists use the term Pareto
Optimality to describe the condition of economic efficiency. When resources are put to
their most efficient use no trade or redistribution among users can squeeze out any more
social value. The concept of Pareto Optimality is critical because it underpins the central
argument in favor of water trading. At their core, proponents for water trading are arguing
for a redistribution of resources that brings society closer to Pareto Optimality.
While command-and-control policies are likely to bring about an inefficient distribu-
tion of water, water markets have their own problems. There are at least three market
failures associated with water resource management: (i) externalities, (ii) under-pricing,
and (iii) open access [Pan07]. Environmentalists point to the externalities associated with
water use. Naturally flowing hydrological systems provide valuable environmental ser-
vices such as flood control and nutrient and sediment cycling. Diminished water flows
disrupts the environmental services provided by rivers and lakes. As a result, water use is
under-priced and over-consumed. There are also externalities involved with agricultural
production, such as contamination by fertilizers and pesticides. The third market failure
concerns open access which also causes over consumption. To some extent, open access
can be resolved by the definition of property rights as mentioned earlier. All three of these
market failures add complexity for policy makers seeking to move away from command-
and-control policies toward market oriented approaches. These market failures suggest
that a pure market solution is unlikely to generate a socially efficient outcome. Instead,
the challenge will be integrating market mechanisms into existing or new institutional
arrangements [HR07].
1.2 The Aquifer of the Mancha Oriental
The Aquifer of the Mancha Oriental (Hydrogeological Unit 08-29 of the Jucar system
[FPGMnR04]), also known as the Eastern Mancha Aquifer, is located in the river Jucar
basin in the south-east of the Iberian Peninsula (see Figure 1.2). The aquifer has a surface
of 7,421 km2, with a permeable surface of 3,625 km2. The main tributary is the Cabriel
river that flows directly into the Jucar, and a number of minor rivers which do not flow
directly into the Jucar, but through infiltration into the aquifer and through the latter into
the river. The whole Jucar system is regulated by three major reservoirs: Alarcón, Con-
treras and Tous, all of them located outside of the Hydrogeological Unit, as well as by
minor dams intended for hydroelectric power generating purposes. The aquifer has, as
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its natural drainage, the Jucar river in the stretch between the two reservoirs of Alarcón
and El Molinar, whose length is approximately 80 km. This aquifer is the main source of
water for urban, industrial and agricultural supply within its area of influence. In a greater
extent, the Jucar river has to satisfy the urban, agricultural and hydroelectric demand of a
significant part of the Valencian Region. The Unit supplies water for irrigation to about
105,000 ha provided with modern irrigation techniques (mainly sprinkler and centre pivot
systems), and for urban consumption, including industrial demand, to a population of over
275,000 equivalent inhabitants. The annual water withdrawal for these purposes is about
450 hm3 (425 hm3 for irrigation and 25 hm3 for urban supply), of which only 60 hm3 are
from surface water, while the rest is extracted from the aquifer [FPGMnR04].
Over the past 30 years, the use of groundwater to supply large surfaces of irrigated
land has been the key to agricultural development in this area and has passed from less
than 20,000 ha in the 1970s to nearly 80,000 ha in our days [FPGMnR04]. In arid and
semiarid zones, irrigation using groundwater has transformed good quality land with low
productivity (caused by drought) into areas of high productivity. But the income level for
the farmers has increased while the rural population base has been maintained. Conse-
quently, the transformation of dry crop lands in the area of this aquifer into irrigated crop
lands, through groundwater capture, has caused precise declines in piezometric levels of
the aquifer, which have been continuously decreasing since 1975, as extraction volumes
have exceeded recharge water volumes. As a result, the aquifer is now close to overex-
ploitation [FPGMnR04, GL07, MdSODO+07].
An Irrigation Users’ Association of Eastern Mancha Aquifer (JCRMO from the Span-
ish Junta Central de Regantes de la Mancha Oriental) was founded in 1994 by users of
the aquifer. This institution includes farmers and any other water user of the Unit with the
main aim of achieving a sustainable level of water use. To achieve this aim, various re-
search and technology transfer projects have been developed in the area since 1995 with
the participation of teams from universities, especially from Castilla La Mancha Uni-
versity, and technology transfer institutions. The participation of the JCRMO has been
crucial for updating technology leading to the solution of several practical problems.
As indicated above, water is mainly used for agricultural irrigation, which accounts for
more than 90% of the total water consumed. Irrigators are thus the first element to be taken
into account in the management of water resources. Urban and industrial withdrawal ac-
counts for less than 10% of the total use and it is jointly managed, as industrial consumers
are connected to the urban network. The bodies acting as representatives in this respect
are the town councils and, by delegation, the companies responsible for the supply of
drinking water to municipal districts. Finally the environmental use has to be considered,
which is represented by the water volume required to ensure environmental and ecologi-
cal health of the Unit, as well as that destined for sport or recreation. In this respect all the
citizens of the community involved would have the right, as well as the duty, of expressing
their views. But in practice, the official stakeholders are the Irrigation Users’ Association
(JCRMO) and the Ministry of Environment (http://www.marm.es) along with the
environmental Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The former is the major user of
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Figure 1.2: Aquifer of the Mancha Oriental in the south-east of the Iberian Peninsula
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Figure 1.3: User Assembly of the Aquifer of the Mancha Oriental organizational structure
water in the Unit, more than 90%, and gathers all the irrigation farms of the Unit, around
105,000 ha and 920 farmers. The latter is the water authority in the area. Clearly, an inte-
grated management implies taking into account the concerns of all those who are directly
interested, for financial, political, social, cultural, or other reasons, in the decisions that
may be taken, which provides an excellent opportunity for the application of agreement
technologies.
Figure 1.3 shows the organizational structure of the User Assembly of the Aquifer of
the Mancha Oriental, whose main goal is to regulate the usage of ground and underground
water for irrigation and other uses, and the rational/not overexploited use of the aquifers
of the zone. The Assembly will also represent its members against public and private
entities in water related cases. But in no case it will interfere in the privative attributions
of the Irrigators Community adhered to the assembly.
Any physical or legal person who owns 0.5 hectares of farm-grown or other no-
farming users could be members of the User Assembly. The only constraint is that the
member must commit to a legal usage of ground and underground water in the regional
influence of the community.
The General Assembly is the higher organism of the User Assembly and it is made up
by all members of the User Assembly. The Assembly President, the Vice-president and
the Secretary will be also of the Governance Board.
The Governance Board is in charge of carrying up the agreements of the General
Assembly and its own agreements. The Governance Board can have up to 14 Members,
of which 8 are elected by the General Assembly among irrigators, 3 are from the adhered
Irrigators Communities, 1 for every possible non farming water use. Every member will
have a corresponding substitute.
The Irrigators and other Uses Jury have to be acquainted of the possible problems
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that can appear among the User Assembly members. They have to impose the norm’s
infringers the corresponding sanctions and establish the compensation to the injured party.
The jury procedure will be public and oral, and will be regulated by the rules of Irrigation
and Use Jury and Article 225 of the Public Domain Hydraulic Rule. The jury has a
President (that is a member of the Governance Board) and two more Members. The Jury
Secretary will be the Governance Board Secretary.
1.2.1 User Census
The General User Census contains:
• Name of the farm and type of water usage.
• Area of the farm in hectares.
• Delimitation, boundary and usage localization.
• District where it is settled.
• Owner’s name.
• Participation in the assembly expenses.
1.2.2 Offenses and Sanctions
Any wrong doing of a member of the General Assembly against other user or the proper
assembly is an offense. The following are considered offenses:
• Any action or omission that alter or damage the water usage that belongs to any
member, as well as the wrong water exploitation.
• The infraction of any of the rules of the User Assembly, as well as the omission of
the duties, and the insubordination to the assembly worker.
• Any action or omission that is detrimental to the User Assembly or its members,
although it is not included in its statute.
Any infraction will be judged by the Irrigation and Other Uses Jury. The jury will
study and qualify the infraction, will impose the sanction to the infractor and will repair
or compensate whenever is required. If the pecuniary sanction is not fulfilled by the
infractor user, the assembly can fulfil it, affecting the execution subsidiary cost to the
infractor.
10 December 03, 2009 AT/2008/D8.2.1/v0.7
D8.2.1 Report: mWater Analysis and Design CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010
1.2.3 Basic norms for the sanction application
The total amount of the sanctions will not be, in any case, greater than the limit defined
for offenses in the Spanish Penal Code.
The sanctions will be graduated by the Irrigation and Other Uses Jury, regarding the
rules, trying to achieve the same sacrifice to the infractor taking into account its economic
capacity and the proportionality principle.
If the offense is the non-payment of the membership fee and other debts, its sanction
will be the required payment of the main amount plus a surcharge.
If the infraction causes damages in other users or the assembly belongings, the sanc-
tion will be the restitution of them, plus a suitable compensation.
The Rules of the Irrigation and Other Uses Jury, will categorize each offense as light,
severe or very severe, concretizing them and defining sanctions.
If the denounced offense was accomplished by a person not member of the Assembly,
it will be denounced by the Governance Board to the qualified court.
1.2.4 Basin Hydrological Plan of the Jucar System
By the end of year 2009, the Basin Hydrological Plan of the Jucar System should be de-
fined by the Basin Administration and made it public. The web page http://www.phjucar.com
publishes draft versions of this plan.
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Chapter 2
mWater: Requirement Specification
In this chapter the requirements of the mWater demonstrator are detailed. Section 2.1
defines the purpose of the demonstrator. The scope and applicability of mWater is drawn
in Section 2.2. The design statements are stated in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 overviews the
relation among the demonstrator and other work packages. Finally, the scope and goals
of the mWater prototype #1 is outlined in Section 2.5.
2.1 Purpose of the demonstrator
The purpose of mWater is to test and prove that Agreement Technologies can be success-
fully used in the construction of a prototype that will address the Water Rights Transfer
problem. This application is of strategic importance for the Spanish society and economy.
mWater will provide an efficient allocation of water resources based on a system of vol-
untary trade in water, which brings potentially large benefits to all parties involved. One
implication of these complex requirements is the need for flexible on-demand negotiation,
initiation, co-ordination, and supervision of various activities represented either through
persons, or non-human actors (i.e., agents and services).
mWater will be a virtual market base system [BGGN09, BGG+09, GGN09], in which
water right transfer agreements will be executed by autonomous normative entities. In
this market base environment different autonomous entities, representing individual or
group of irrigators, industries, or other water user entities, will get in contact with water
right holders that want to transfer their rights. They will be able to negotiate the terms
and conditions of the transfer agreement following the National Hydrological Plan and
Basin Hydrological Plan normative laws. At the same time, the Basin Administration
entities will be represented in the mWater system as normative and or referee entities that
will assure the correct execution of the water balanced distribution and usage. In order
to reach the goal of this Work Package task the focus will be on developing a good water
right market design that can take into account the dynamics inherent in the water sector
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2.2 Scope and Applicability
The water management sector has a large list of very complex associated problems that
can take advantages of virtual market base systems for water right transfer. Some of these
Agreement Technologies based applications could be:
1. An agreement-based framework of water right markets that takes into account: wa-
ter markets scenarios; buyers, sellers and third parties; ”prices” for water; the mech-
anism to participate in water right markets; water transportation infrastructure, and;
the role of government authorities (normative and/or referee entities).
2. A virtual agreement-based laboratory for studying the dynamic effects of different
water market policies on the prices and quantities of water sold in the market. Such
an Agreement Technologies based application can make the water market socially
optimal, that is, sell rights at prices that reflect the true value of water in the region.
3. A decision support system based on water right transfer agreements that can help
the Basin Administration on the evaluation of different management activities. Me-
diation techniques which require fewer resources will aid the market in discovering
a greater degree of allocation efficiency.
4. An evaluation framework to compare agent-based models and mathematical models
for water markets.
5. A simulation tool for studying water evolving markets in which different market-
shaping elements can evolve and adapt. For example: changing market structures,
adaptive negotiation protocols, market model meta-reasoning, etc.
2.3 mWater: Previous Design Statements
As indicated above, the mWater demonstrator aims at formulating a common application
example for the assessment of agreement technologies under a multi-agent framework.
From the very beginning, the underlying idea is to propose a water market domain in
which different stakeholders interact to trade water rights and reach a win-win agreement.
2.3.1 Water markets and banks
The term of water market can be defined as an institutional, decentralized framework
where users with water rights (right-holders) are allowed to voluntarily trade them, always
fulfilling some pre-established rules, to other users in exchange of some compensation,
economic or not [Cal06, RGL04, Tho97]. In general, water rights are transferred only
under temporal basis; this means trading water physically only within a time period, but
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the right-holders keep their rights. This is done in such a way to avoid creating new
right-holders.
Water markets can allow rapid changes in allocation in response to changing demands
for water and can stimulate investment and employment as users are assured of access to
secure supplies of water. Because of water’s unique characteristics, such markets do not
work everywhere, they are not homogenous as present different organization schemata,
nor do they solve all water-related issues [Tho97]. Therefore, it is essential to design
appropriate water laws and regulate, either privately or publicly, the users’ actions, in-
teractions and their eventual trade. By doing this, water markets can effectively address
rising demands for groundwater and for surface water found in rivers, lakes, and canals.
In that line, international experience in USA (particularly California), Chile, Australia
or Mexico has demonstrated that (formal) water markets can improve the economic effi-
ciency of water use and stimulate investment [RGL04, Tho97].
On the other hand, a water bank might be considered like a financial bank (or credit
cooperative) that facilitates exchanges among users, members or right-holders who want
to buy (borrow) and those who want to sell (deposit) [Jae]. In the case of a credit coop-
erative, the institution may be little more than a clearinghouse that makes the exchanges
easier among members and charges a small fee to cover its operating costs. Financial re-
sources are transferred from those who deposit funds for a price (interest earned) to those
who pay (in interest) to borrow funds. An independent water bank could operate in much
the same way, with limited involvement or funding by government. The willingness of
irrigators to buy or sell water highly depends on the difference between the price of wa-
ter and net revenue each farmer expects to earn by irrigating. Thus, for a given price of
irrigation water, a farmer would be willing to purchase water if (s)he expects a unit of
water to generate more incomes than it costs. If another farmer expects a unit of water
to earn less that (s)he could sell it for, (s)he might want to sell it. If all farmers earned
the same net revenue per unit of water, little would be gained from water transfer [Jae].
Nevertheless, a water bank can also be used in exceptional situations of drought periods
or aquifers’ over-exploitation [Cal06]. In such a case, the water banks are managed by
the basin organisms, thus making public offers of water rights to give them back to other
users. Here, the price is established by the organism itself, in order to promote a higher
transparency in the transfer of rights and to create a more dynamic scenario.
2.3.2 Some market scenarios
At this point, we present several market scenarios to be used in the mWater demonstrator.
We start from a simple scenario and progressively we make it more complex.
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Scenario #1. Water markets among water users of the same basin
The simplest scenario of a water market is the one created for the members of the same
basin. In essence, it comprises the temporary transfer of water rights from one right-
holder to another after reaching an agreement in terms of the right to be transferred and
the economic compensation associated to such a transfer [BGGN09, BGG+09, GGN09].
The stakeholders are formed by all the users (members) of the basin (see section 1.1.2
for all current water uses), together with the administrative organisms of the basin and,
when necessary, the associated Ministry of the Environment. The water market in Spain
is strongly regulated and imposes several constraints. Firstly, water rights can only be
transferred between users of the same or higher preference order defined by the Basin
Hydrological Plan, as introduced in section 1.1.2. For example, irrigation rights can only
be transferred for alternative irrigation or human water supply but not for industrial uses.
Furthermore, in this scenario we focus just on irrigation rights and do not consider water
trading for industrial uses, aquiculture, leisure or navigation. Secondly, non consumptive
rights can only be transferred to other non consumptive uses. Finally, both parts of the
transfer (the seller and the buyer) must have the concession of the water right in property,
thus preventing non-holders from participating in the market. This means that in our
scenario only users that have previous irrigation rights can participate in the market1. A
water right usually represents an amount of water that can be pumped out of a river, canal,
aquifer, etc. during a whole season or harvest. For instance, a particular water right could
allow its holder to pump out up to 10 m3 of water per day during the next cotton season.
The two right-holders that participate in the market are allowed by law to establish
the economic compensation by means of a private agreement process, signing a formal
contract that is used as an official record. This record is publicly available to the other
members of the basin in case some of them want to allege its applicability, i.e. when this
transfer is detrimental to a third party, it can complain against this transfer. In such a
case, the administrative organisms of the basin study the effects of the transfer and decide
whether it is finally applicable.
In most cases, the transfer of water does not need particular infrastructure as the river
or the canal itself is used to move water from the seller to the buyer. However, when
water requires third parties’ infrastructure, its use must be freely agreed by the three
parties: seller, buyer and infrastructure’s owner. If the infrastructure elements belong to
the basin organism, both the seller and the buyer need to ask for their use to the organism,
which determines the usage fee. In any case, the transportation cost of the transfer needs
to be included in the final cost of the water transfer. According to the European water
framework directive, the idea of this usage fee is to charge final users with the real cost
of infrastructure and environmental impact without affecting negatively to the efficiency
of the market. In general, this efficiency is measured in terms of economic issues to
1Obviously, this restriction limits the potential of the market’s benefits and the efficiency of the water
use [Cal06]. A straightforward extension could remove this restriction and allow any user at any level of
water use, with or without previous water rights, to participate in the market.
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reallocate water to the highest value uses [RGL04, Tho97]. But, in this scenario we can
consider also the social benefit in order to achieve socially optimal solutions.
We can make this scenario more flexible by including two extensions. In the former,
it is possible to consider both the seller and the buyer as grouped entities, i.e. instead
of having only one member playing the role of seller/buyer, a set of members may join
together to participate in the market at a higher scale. For instance, a given seller has a
water right of 2 m3 per day, which is clearly insufficient for a buyer that needs 10 m3
of water. If more sellers are grouped it would be possible to have water rights to fit the
requirement of the buyer, which analogously can be grouped in a larger buyer entity.
Now, the stakeholders of this scenario will need to take into consideration the seller/buyer
entity and model the interactions among the particular members of each entity. In the
latter, we can make differences among the water rights to be traded depending on the
river section. For instance, upstream water can be more valuable than downstream as its
quality is significantly better.
Finally, it is important to note that this scenario has been entirely placed within a for-
mal setting, where: (i) a contract is signed, (ii) and economic transaction is performed in
the form of a compensation, and (iii) a record is publicly available in the given organisms
to third parties. However, there exists a long tradition among irrigators of the same basin
to participate in informal, i.e. non-officially regulated, markets. In such a case, water trad-
ing is seen as a punctual, locally trade of water amounts without monetary transactions
(the two members exchange irrigation shifts, particular farm machinery, etc.) and rely on
informal agreements based on previous trust [Cal06]. Although, obviously there is not an
official regulation here, this type of market is very usual in the regions of Valencia and
Murcia (east coast of Spain).
Scenario #2. Water markets among water users of different basins
This scenario extends the scenario #1 by allowing water users of different basins to be
involved in the same water market. The description of the previous scenario is fully valid
here, but now the stakeholders are members of different basins and the administrative
organisms are those of all the basins with active members in the market. When different
basins participate in the same market it makes it more necessary to have a higher governor
entity, which is the Ministry of the Environment. This scenario works in the same way as
scenario #1 but, as there exists a higher number of stakeholders, the number of interactions
is much higher.
Furthermore, since the scope of this market is clearly broader than in scenario #1,
two restrictions need to be fulfilled. First, the market is created under a formal basis, i.e.
informal markets are not possible here. Second, water trade is subject to the availability
of infrastructure for water transfer, which usually entails a higher transportation cost, and
strongly regulated by the National Hydrological Plan.
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Scenario #3. Water banks
In Spain, water banks are activated in exceptional situations of drought periods or aquifers’
over-exploitation [Cal06]. A water bank is strongly regulated and managed by an ex-
change bureau, either private or public. Because of the extreme situation where water
banks are activated, several situations are possible:
• The basin organisms have the legal authority to create public offers for acquiring
water rights and transfer them to other users at a price established by the organisms
themselves. The idea here is to facilitate the relations between sellers and buyers,
reducing the cost of the transactions and promoting a more transparent scenario.
Note that by doing this, the administrative organisms have the opportunity to buy
rights despite not having concessions of water rights in property.
• The water market that is created comprises different basins, like in scenario #2, and
it is common that the users are exempt from paying the water transportation cost,
which comes from using public infrastructure and it is, consequently, charged to
the public budget. The problem here arises because of the third-party effects [Jae],
which in some cases include political fights that might limit potential transactions.
• The apparition of a private or public intermediary can improve the efficiency of
the water trading process [RGL04]. As these intermediaries know perfectly who
supply and demand water, and which is the easiest way of transporting it, they can
introduce more agility in the market. In this case, there exists a new stakeholder that
is not strictly a buyer/seller nor is a right-holder, but plays an active role in getting
a better efficiency in the market.
• Some users, for instance irrigators, join together to form a bigger community to
buy arable land in the same, or other basins, and thereby acquiring its water rights.
Formally speaking, this is not a temporal transfer of water rights but a transaction
of buying a permanent right that is associated to bought land.
In this scenario we can relax the situation for activating a water bank, making it more
flexible, and use it in drought or wet periods, as usual in many other countries such as
USA, Chile or Australia. The main reason for doing this is that it can promote a better
use of water [RGL04, Tho97].
Scenario #4. Water brokers
Under the idea of ’first the stock market, now water’ a new scenario can be opened. In this
last scenario, water policy mirrors the economic policy by creating transaction agencies
(brokers) where users make public their needs of selling or buying water rights. This
agency fits the necessities of buying and selling at competitive prices under the law of
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supply and demand, similarly to the stock market. As in scenario #3, this type of private
agency acts as an intermediary and, though it is a new stakeholder, it does not really
sell nor buy any water right. Also, depending on the type of agency it may include an
additional fee to the water transaction, or nothing in cases of non-profit making agencies.
Finally, a more complex scenario can be modeled in the line of a futures market. The
underlying idea is that a stakeholder (a particular one or some of them in a community)
buys some water rights to a seller based on some unknown circumstances in the future.
For instance, a buyer borrows the right to use 10 m3 of water per day during the summer
season if (s)he really needs that water, e.g. in absence of rainfall during the summer.
This means the buyer has to pay a fixed fee to the seller for the mere fact of having that
future right and, if this right is finally used, the buyer must pay the seller the water that
is transferred at an agreed price. The advantages of this scenario are twofold. First, the
buyer has the guarantee of having water independently of the rainfall, that is, the buyer
pays for a kind of insurance on water availability and later pays for the water that is really
consumed in the transfer. On the other hand, the seller receives a fixed amount of money
for the right to use his/her water and an additional compensation if that water is used; but
if finally not all that water is consumed by the buyer, (s)he can still use the remaining
water. This setting is very interesting for both stakeholders, but includes a more dynamic
behavior in the scenario and certain uncertainty that needs to me managed in the future.
2.4 Interaction among mWater and other AT WPs
In this section we draw the relationship among the different Agreement Technologies
Working Packages and the mWater functioning and components. Figure 2.1 shows the
different technologies that mWater will require from the AT WPs. These elements will be
integrated in the different components of the mWater prototypes.
2.4.1 Technology challenges of mWater
The first design of mWater presented in previous section leads us to believe that mWater is
an interesting sandbox for AT. But how can we use it for testing agreement technologies?
Some key issues on using AT notions in mWater are discussed here.
Organizational models, structures of basins and organisms, and ontologies for nego-
tiation (WP1 and WP4) that must be dynamic and flexible enough to specify versatile
and regulated market scenarios. Because water’s unique characteristics, such markets do
not work everywhere; they are not homogenous as they present different organization
schemata. mWater requires organization structures that restrict the way agreements are
reached by fixing the social structure of the participating entities (taking into account for
example the NHP): the capabilities of their roles and the relationships among them (e.g.
power and authority). Therefore, we need flexible models that can be easily extended.
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mWater
An agreement-based framework of water right markets
































Figure 2.1: Interaction among mWater and other AT WPs
Normative regulation for negotiation and execution of agreements and contracts (WP2
and WP7). It is essential to conform to the water laws and market norms, and to regulate
the users’ actions, interactions and their eventual trade within the scope of the market
execution. Declarative semantics are required to specify and represent obligations and
prohibitions over roles, or over the combination of components. A normative framework
is required to specify and guarantee the constraints of the water right agreements, and the
processes to reach them.
Techniques for flexible on-demand individual and collective negotiation of humans or
non-human actors (i.e., agents and services). It is often the case that a water right holder
is motivated to achieve a goal (buy or sell its right) that is only possible by gaining the
collaboration of other elements (i.e., a federation of water right holders). In other words,
we will probably need to deal with an aggregation of opinions (WP3) for conflict and
grievance resolution, and their further application. It is also possible to require planning
techniques for service composition, thus reaching a common agreement. In such cases,
it is required to generate an explicit mutually acceptable agreement through negotiation
and to define detailed workflows that regulate the activities and combinations of roles in
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the organization, as well as their associated data flow. mWater demands also models and
techniques for judgement aggregation, argumentation, persuasion, normative reasoning
and agreement planning. Additionally, models for agreement patterns specification are
also important. Relations among different agreements (sub-agreements), for example a
situation in which in order to get a water right transfer a buyer requires to contract a
transportation resource from other users. Specification and negotiation of contracts in
terms of preambles, operative part, conditions precedent, operative provisions, and other
agreements or contract annexed, etc.
Techniques for initiation, coordination, and supervision of different forms of agree-
ment, contracts and grievance (WP6). This is also closely related to trust models (WP5)
that may affect the negotiation modes (WP2 and WP3) and the contracts themselves
(WP6). For instance, when trust levels are high, users may do without signed contracts.
On the contrary, when trust is scarce, a signed contract will be essential. But even when
water right agreements or contracts are signed, the behavior of the participating entities
might not be completely determined as their autonomy and selfishness might cause them
not to honor their commitments if there is a potential gain in doing so. An approach is
required to deal with it.
Finally, an approach to summarize the history of agreements and subsequent agree-
ment executions in order to build long-term relationships between the water right market
participants is also required.
2.4.2 A fertile Case-Study for AT
The following is a sketch of four study themes that, we believe, make the mWater frame-
work a fertile case-study for the testing and development of agreement technologies, as
presented in [BGGN09, BGG+09].
A regulated environment. The mWater scenario requires the expression and use of
norms and regulations of different sorts: from actual laws and regulations issued by gov-
ernments, to policies and local regulations issued by basin managers, to social norms that
prevail in a given community of users. Current regulations impose certain constitutive
restrictions, like the total order on seven very specific types of water use, that may be
readily regimented into the institutional specification. Likewise for procedural require-
ments (for instance, the Ministry’s acknowledgement before a transfer becomes active).
However, there are regulations that should not be regimented that way and should be ex-
pressed in declarative form in order to guarantee some formal properties, and comply or
enforce them after some situated reasoning. Then, there is the problem of expressiveness:
the type of norms we have dealt with so far have straightforward formal representations
that are amenable for formal and computational manipulation but, as the literature in
the field shows, questions and alternatives abound. As can be noted, some norms will
be regimented as part of the electronic institutional framework specification, but others
need to be expressed in a declarative form so that one may reason about them, both off-
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and on-line, both at design and at run time, and both from the institutional (or legisla-
tive) perspective and the agent’s individual perspective. Issues that are relevant in this
respect range from the choice of expressive formalism to the decision-making strategies
that agents might use to comply or disobey regulations. Thus, structural aspects like
governance, dynamics of norms (also from the legislative and execution perspectives) as
well as criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of norms may and need to be explored in the
demonstrator [CAJB09, CAB09].
Organizational and collective interaction. There are good opportunities to study the
interplay between formal institutional aspects (laws, ontologies and sanctioned practices),
the organizations that enforce or should abide by them and the individuals that form those
organizations [AGV+04, APA+07, HGPRG+09] or participate in the regulated activities.
Also, the scenario involves collective actors that may not only have their own social rules
for allocating rights and solving conflicts but also become involved in negotiation as col-
lective entities. One immediate extension is to capture all those roles currently recognized
by legislation that have any impact on trading, agreement management, grievances and
conflict resolution. That is the case, for instance, of the “comunidades de regantes” (agri-
cultural users associations) who interact with a municipal government or a power plant
to negotiate transfers of rights, or as plaintiffs or defendants in conflicts over the use of
water. Once again there is the possibility of studying organizational and institutional dy-
namics, the way rules become internalized by individuals and the emergence of collective
norms. These matters suggest also the opportunity to study collective decision-making,
judgement aggregation and other formal and informal ways of social choice. Similarly,
we want to study the roles and operations of non-trading organizations that somehow
affect demand (e.g., water treatment plants, water distribution companies, municipality
services, water transport firms and infrastructure). Finally, given the rich sociological
content of water use, the scenario should provide enough empirical grounds for playing
with notions like trust and reputation, moral authority, power and force that are crucial in
practice but have not been thoroughly studied in a MAS context, yet.
Structured and spontaneous conflict. A significant part of the proposed framework
involves the specification of valid negotiation protocols, as we will see below, and there-
fore the possibility of studying negotiation heuristics, agent architectures adapted to those
negotiation capabilities on one side, and on the other the systematic study of the negotia-
tion conventions themselves. Moreover, the framework includes a space —what we call
agreement management— where once an agreement for the transfer of water rights has
been reached, contracts are negotiated and executed and agreements and contracts may
be contested. While the general process for agreement management is properly regulated,
the idea is to leave enough flexibility in the institutional framework so that the general
idea of an agent managed contract may be explored in earnest. Likewise, those struc-
tured interactions that happen after trading rights are excellent brewing environments to
study conflicts (detonators, structure and types) and conflict resolution; in particular, the
possibility of using and devising non-conventional forms of on-line dispute resolution.
Simulation environment. The engineering of the demonstrator requires sophisticated
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software tools for specification [JB04, BJC+06, SJR+02, GB04b], construction, testing
and monitoring of the on-line market and the participating agents. We plan to attach sim-
ulation services to the electronic institution infrastructure along the lines of [ANRAS07]
and thus facilitate the coupling of mWater as a water use module of sophisticated basin
simulators for water use policy purposes. Another outcome we foresee is the use of our
demonstrator as a proof-of-concept prototype for the actual water banks (and banks for
other natural resources) envisaged in current legislation. Further developments include
a more robust information model for a better handling of privacy and collective speech
acts: a systematic treatment of scene splicing (to have modular add-ons); proactive in-
terventions in AMELI, so that prohibitions, obligations and the invitation and expulsion
of agents may be instrumented through scene managers; and a generic human interface
service that map governor interactions with an external agent into a human-web-user in-
terface.
2.5 mWater prototype #1
mWater prototype #1 will address Market Scenario #1 of Section 2.3. Subsequent mWater
prototypes will add other market scenarios in order to get the full mWater prototype by
the end of the AT project.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of mWater prototype #1
In this chapter the analysis of mWater prototype #1 is detailed. In Section 3.1 we identify
the goals of the Market Scenario that will be implemented in prototype #1. Section 3.2
describes the stakeholders, whereas the roles and organizational structure of the market
scenario are presented in Section 3.3. The different market-shaping elements are de-
scribed in Section 3.4. The detailed activities of the scenario are analyzed in Section
3.5. Finally, the performance and quality criteria for this market scenario are presented in
Section 3.6
3.1 Market Scenario Goals
The following are goals of the Market Scenario implemented in mWater prototype #1:
• All the water right transfers executed in mWater should attain an ecological balance
of water resource use.
• mWater will come to an equity distribution of water among its different water users.
• The different playing roles of the market scenario will try to maximize their pecu-
niary compensations.
Figure 3.1 depicts the goals of mWater #1 and its stakeholders, which are deeply
explained in the next section.
3.2 Stakeholders
mWater prototype #1 has the following stakeholders:
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Figure 3.1: mWater #1, goals and stakeholders
• Water users of the User Assembly: A water user is a water right holder. The
different type of water uses define the water users, which are:
– Human water suppliers: a company that supplies water for human consump-
tion, and low consuming industries.
– Irrigators: owner of a property that uses water for agriculture.
– Power companies: a company that produces electricity by means of hydraulic
power.
– Industries: other industrial uses that are not included in the first point.
– Aquiculture Users: water use for growing plants (without soil) in water con-
taining dissolved nutrients.
– Leisure Users: sport and leisure uses of water.
– Navigation and Aquatic Transportation.
• Basin Administration: the Hydrographic Federation representative for assuring an
adequate management of the water requests, in order to promote saving and socio-
economical efficiency in the different water uses.
• Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Affair: it is the major au-
thority on water uses regulation.
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Figure 3.2: mWater #1 roles and organizational structure
• The Irrigators and other Uses Jury: this jury have to be acquainted of the possible
problems that may appear among the User Assembly members.
3.3 Roles and Organizational structure
In this section the different playing roles of the market scenario are cited. The first four
are internal roles, whereas the other three are external ones.
• Water User: a water right-holder of the basin.
• Buyer: a Water User that wants to transfer its right and or buy a transportation
resource.
• Seller: a Water User that wants to purchase rights and or sell a transportation re-
source.
• Third party: a Water User that can be affected by a water-right transfer agreement.
• Basin regulating authority: the Basin Administration representative that can au-
thorize a water-right transfer agreement.
• Jury: the referee entity in problems among the contracting parties and (possibly)
third parties of a water-right transfer agreement.
• Market facilitator: a management entity for assuring the execution of the different
activities (see Section 3.5) in the market scenario.
The roles of the market scenario and the organizational structure are outlined in Figure
3.2.
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3.4 Market-shaping elements
The following subsections describe the market-shaping elements that configure the market
scenario of mWater #1.
3.4.1 Market ontology
The following are the ontology concepts of the market scenario of mWater #1.
• Water: The attributes that define a water resource are:
– Type of water.
– Source (river, dam, underground).
• Water user: The attributes that define a water user are:
– Name of the farm.
– Area of the farm in hectares (ha).
– Delimitation and boundary localization.
– District where it is settled.
– Owner’s name.
– Participation in the assembly expenses.
– Water volume.
– Type of water (usage).




– District where it is settled.
– Time Period.
– Type of water.
• Water-right transfer
– Water user.
– Type (offer, demand).
– Water volume.
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– District where it is settled.
– Time Period.
– Type of water (purified, underground, etc.)
– Water Price.
– Associated water-right.





– Status (Published, Authorized, Not-Authorized, Executed).
– Price.
– Associated agreements.









– District where it is settled.
– Time Period.
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– Associated Water-right transfer contract.
– Offense
– Denouncement Date.




– Amount of the sanction.
– Status (Pending, Executed)
– Sanction Date.








– Location, basin(s) in which it is located.
– Source Type (river, dam, ground water).
– Capacity.
3.4.2 Resources
Obviously, the main resource in mWater is water, but it is not the only one. There are
different water sources which are also resources of the system, and the transportation
infrastructure that connects different sources and allows water flow.
• River. A natural watercourse, usually freshwater, flowing toward an ocean, a lake,
a sea or another river.
• Dam. A barrier that impounds water or underground streams.
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• Underground Water. Water that is subterranean.
• Transportation infrastructure. The transportation network that allows water flows.
It can include rivers, canals, pipes, waterways, watercourses, wells, and their con-
nections.
3.4.3 Water pricing factors
Water is scarce in many contexts (drought, degraded quality, etc.), so water pricing is
increasingly seen as an acceptable instrument of public policy. Water-use charges, pollu-
tion charges, tradable permits for water withdrawals or release of specific pollutants, and
fines are all market-based approaches that can contribute to making water more accessi-
ble, healthier and more sustainable over the long term [Jon]. Consequently, water, as a
scarce resource and in demand, commands a price. The factors for water pricing are very
varied and highly depend on the use of that water. An intrinsic problem for water pricing
is its diversity, both in time and space. Particularly, there exists a high and increasing
water demand, which presents inelastic stretches at low prices in wet seasons, and elastic
stretches at high prices that correspond to drought or more water consuming seasons in
several specific areas [RGL04].
In its origin, water prices are very disperse and highly depend on the basin, its place-
ment and type of water (surface or ground). They may range from 0.1-0.4 euros/m3 (0.15
in the average) in normal years and 0.15-0.6 euros/m3 (0.35 in the average) in drought
years for surface water [Cal06]. On the other hand, ground water from aquifers has
usually a higher price than surface water, e.g. 0.12-0.75 euros/m3 and are more zone-
dependent. Transportation costs may range from 0.10-0.12 euros/m3 but, obviously, they
are very variable depending on the type of required infrastructure, the distance and the
height to be covered, which also requires additional energy consumption, such as elec-
tricity. Fortunately for irrigators, it is usual that in drought years this latter cost is partly
defrayed by the government.
In the destination, water pricing is becoming more widespread, with the dual aim of
expanding supply and encouraging a more responsible use. As the most water consuming
agent is agriculture, it is there where there exists a higher variability. In agriculture, the
water cost is directly related to the cost for producing crops. Clearly, the pricing highly
depends on the number of harvests per year and the type of crop, ranging for instance
from saffron that requires 1,000 m3/ha to alfalfa that requires 7,600. Although these
values keep more or less constant, they may suffer small variations from year to year and
from one area to another, which makes the factors for water pricing more complex.
One additional area of water policy that has become increasingly subject to pricing
principles is that of public human (and reduced-consumption industries) water supply,
together with wastewater services (sewerage and sewage). Efficient and effective water
pricing systems provide incentives for efficient water use and for water quality protec-
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tion. They also generate funds for necessary infrastructure development and expansion,
and provide a good basis for ensuring that water services can be provided to all citizens
at an affordable price. The metering of water consumption is a prerequisite for the ap-
plication of efficient water pricing policies. About two-thirds of OECD (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development) member countries already meter more than
90% of single-family houses, although universal metering remains a controversial issue in
some contexts, where ’the more you use, the more you pay’-idea is not fully implemented
(e.g. in many places metering tends to be for water supplies entering the building, rather
than for individual apartments) [Jon]. Again, this makes the factors for water pricing more
difficult.
Overall, industrial water consumption levels are actually not a very good proxy for
industrial sewerage and sewage disposal costs, which also have an important impact in
the final water pricing, as discharges vary so much from industry to industry. Hence
the trend in OECD countries towards separating (i) industrial water use charges from (ii)
wastewater charges.
Finally, European countries are working towards more complete recovery of infras-
tructure and operating costs from users, under the application of the European water
framework directive: charge final users with the real cost of infrastructure and environ-
mental impact, which seems to be a more natural way to establish the real water price.
3.4.4 Market entrance conditions
The user has to be a water-right holder, willing to exchange water-rights by means of
transfer agreements, and/or interested to be informed on the different water-right agree-
ments executed in mWater.
3.4.5 Normative framework
The NHP plus the different market norms associated with the activities of Section 3.5.
3.5 Activities in the Market scenario
In this section we describe the different activities that are required for the market sce-
nario. Each activity is described including the goals, the playing roles, roles’ executing
conditions, and the activity regulating norms.
• Admission and Registration of Water Users. This activity includes the different
steps for registering water users in mWater.
– Activity Goals: Register Water User.
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– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Basin Regulating Authority, Water User.
– Execution Conditions: The Water User is interested in participating in water-
right transfer agreements and/or wants to be informed of water-right agree-
ments executed in mWater.
– Norms: The Water User has to be a water right-holder of the basin.
• Registration of a Buyer. This activity includes the interaction required for regis-
tering a water-right buyer.
– Activity Goals: Register a Buyer.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User, Buyer.
– Execution Conditions: The water user is seeking for purchasing water-rights.
– Norms: The Buyer has no pending sanctions.
• Registration of a Seller. This activity includes the interaction required for regis-
tering a water-right seller.
– Activity Goals: Register a Seller.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User, Seller.
– Execution Conditions: The water user is interested in selling its water-right in
the future.
– Norms: The Seller has no pending sanctions.
• Group Formation
– Activity Goals: Create a group of water users that want to sell or buy water-
rights as a single entity.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User.
– Execution Conditions: The water users are interested in configuring a seller
or buyer group association.
– Norms: No water user of the group has pending sanctions.
• Publish Water-Right Offer
– Activity Goals: Make public a water-right offer.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Seller.
– Execution Conditions: The seller has a water-right he/she is not willing to use,
and he/she wants to sell it at a given price.
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– Norms: The seller owns the water-right he/she is offering. The time period
in the offer is for the future, and does not exceed the remaining time for the
concession expiration. The time period of the water-right offer is not already
sold. The seller has no pending sanctions.
• Publish Water-Right Demand
– Activity Goals: Make public a water-right demand
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Buyer.
– Execution Conditions: The buyer wants to purchase water-rights for a given
time period, and at a given price.
– Norms: The buyer has no pending sanctions. The time period in the demand
is for the future.
• Withdraw Water-Right Offer
– Activity Goals: Remove a water-right offer.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Seller.
– Execution Conditions: The seller wants to withdraw a water-right offer al-
ready published by him/her.
– Norms: The water-right offer was published by the seller who wants to with-
draw it. There is no water-right agreement related with the water-right that is
pending for authorization.
• Withdraw Water-Right Demand
– Activity Goals: Delete a water-right demand.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Buyer.
– Execution Conditions: The buyer wants to withdraw a water-right demand
already published by him/her.
– Norms: The water-right demand was published by the buyer who wants to
withdraw it. There is no water-right transfer agreement related with the water-
right that is pending for authorization.
• Query Water-Right offers
– Activity Goals: Seek information on current water-right offers.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User
– Execution Conditions: The water user wants to know which are the water-right
offers that are currently published.
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– Norms: No norm applies.
• Query Water-Right demands
– Activity Goals: Seek information on current water-right demands.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User
– Execution Conditions: The water user wants to know which are the water-right
demands that are currently published.
– Norms: No norm applies.
• Negotiate Water-Right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: Negotiate the terms and conditions of a water-right transfer
agreement. Sign a water-right transfer contract.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Buyer, Seller, Third Party.
– Execution Conditions: The seller wants to sell a water-right and the buyer
wants to purchase it (and possibly there is a third party affected by the trans-
fer).
– Norms: The buyer and seller have no pending sanctions. The seller owns the
water-right that is being negotiated. There is no water-right transfer agreement
related with the negotiating water-right that is pending for authorization. The
time period of the water-right offer is not already sold.
• Registration and Publication of Water-Right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: Make public a water-right transfer agreement. Register the
water-right transfer agreement in order to get it authorized.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Buyer, Seller, Third Party.
– Execution Conditions: The buyer and seller (and possibly a third party) have
a signed water-right transfer agreement and want to get the authorization from
the Basin Administration to execute it.
– Norms: The water-right agreement is endorsed by the buyer and seller (and
possibly by a third party).
• Query Water-Right transfer agreements
– Activity Goals: Seek information on current water-right agreements that are
in publishing status.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User
– Execution Conditions: The water user wants to know which are the water-right
agreements that are currently published.
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– Norms: No norm applies.
• Allegation (grievance) against a Water-Right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: Denounce a water-right transfer agreement.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Water User, Third Party
– Execution Conditions: A water user finds out that he/she is being affected by
a water-right transfer agreement and wants to denounce it.
– Norms: The denouncement must be presented on time.
• Authorization of Water-Right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: Authorize a water-right transfer agreement.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Basin regulating authority.
– Execution Conditions: A water-right transfer agreement is published and is
pending for authorization.
– Norms: The water-right transfer agreement conforms to the NHP normative
regulation on water-right transfer. There is no allegation against the water-
right transfer agreement.
• Execution of Water-Right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: The buyer gets the water-right transferred from the seller. The
seller receives its pecuniary compensation from the buyer. If there is a Third
Party, he/she also receive the agreed compensation.
– Playing Roles: Buyer, Seller, and possibly Third Party.
– Execution Conditions: The water-right transfer agreement is authorized and
the parties want to execute it.
– Norms: The water-right transfer agreement was previously authorized by the
Basin Administration. There is no allegation against the water-right transfer
agreement.
• Hearing of water dispute
– Activity Goals: Judge a water dispute.
– Playing Roles: Water User, Jury.
– Execution Conditions: A water user has a water dispute with other water user
and denounces it to the Jury.
– Norms: The allegations presented by the prosecutor against the other water
user are any of the followings:
34 December 03, 2009 AT/2008/D8.2.1/v0.7
D8.2.1 Report: mWater Analysis and Design CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010
∗ Any action or omission that alters or damages the water usage that be-
longs to any member, as well as the wrong water exploitation.
∗ The infraction of any of the rules of the User Assembly, as well as the
omission of the duties, and the insubordination to the assembly worker.
∗ Any action or omission that is detrimental to the User Assembly or its
members, although it is not included in its statutes.
• Sanctioning offenses in a water-right transfer agreement
– Activity Goals: Sanction offenses in a water-right transfer agreement.
– Playing Roles: Water User, Basin regulating authority, Jury.
– Execution Conditions: There is a sanction for a water user that needs execu-
tion.
– Norms: The Jury has judged the offense and decided to sanction it.
• Expel Water user
– Activity Goals: Expel water users that do not conform with the basin norma-
tive regulation and the market rules.
– Playing Roles: Market Facilitator, Basin regulating authority, Water user.
– Execution Conditions: There is an infraction of the market rules and the water
user has to be expelled from the market.
– Norms: several, open norms can be applied here.
3.6 Performance and quality criteria for the market
Deciding when a model for a water market is better than another is an essential goal for
evaluating the performance and quality of a market scenario. Clearly, the quality of such
a complex model cannot be measured just in terms of one factor and, as commonly agreed
in literature [CLM04], water resources planning must combine a multiobjective analysis
that comprises multiple criteria based on differing objectives, responsibilities and interests
among the stakeholders, groups or institutions involved in the market. The problem here
relies on the conflicting nature of these criteria, because minimizing one criterion usually
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• Agricultural self-sufficiency.
• Financial feasibility, which includes all costs seen in Section 3.4.3.
The two first issues include maximizing regional economic deployment and minimiz-
ing unemployment. Since high water-consuming industries are those that employ many
workers, employment is sensitive to water availability in most regions. Social welfare and
environment preservation is usually obtained by increasing the amount of available wa-
ter, its quality and making a better use of the demand for domestic and small industries.
From the agricultural perspective, the goal is to maximize food production in order to
attain self-sufficiency and nutrition, while also minimizing the cost of such water and its
transportation (function of land area, effective rainfall and water supply availability and
crop mix). Finally, all these issues can be achieved at a high global cost which is based
on industry structure, population, quality standards, existing treatment plants, investment
for new treatment plants, and policy for water allocation among agriculture, industry and
domestic sectors.
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Design of mWater prototype #1
The mWater framework is rooted on traditional practices and regulations for the use and
transfer of water rights that are either currently established by the Spanish National Hy-
drological Plan or are to be part of the forthcoming Basin Hydrological Plans. However,
it is somewhat idealized in order to provide a richer sandbox for agreement technologies
and a more malleable platform for demand and water use modeling in an hydrographic
basin [BGG+09]. The core component of the mWater demonstrator is an agent-based vir-
tual market for water usage rights that intends to grasp the components of an electronic
market where water rights could be traded with flexibility and under different price-fixing
mechanisms. However, in addition to trading proper, the demonstrator also includes those
activities that follow trading; namely, the agreement on a contract, the use and misuse
of rights and the grievances and corrective actions taken therein. These ancillary activi-
ties are particularly prone to conflict albeit regulated through legal and social norms, and
therefore a crucial objective in policy-making and a natural environment for agreement
technologies.
Our immediate goal is to establish an institutional framework for an on-line market
of water rights. In this paper we only sketch the institutional framework that regiments
trading and the main ancillary activities. It is institutional in the sense that we make ex-
plicit the conventions that determine: i) what actions are valid within the market, ii) what
are the conditions these actions must satisfy, and iii) what are their intended effects. For
the construction of that framework we follow the IIIA Electronic Institution (EI) concep-
tual model [AEN+05], where an institution is specified through two main blocks: one
that deals with ontological components (the dialogical framework that specifies ontology,
language, roles and information model) and another for deontological components (the
performative structure that includes, both, interaction models and procedural prescrip-
tions, as well as rules of behavior for commitment-making conventions). For the actual
specification and implementation of mWater we use the EIDE platform.1 The following
1EIDE is a development environment for Electronic Institutions, built at the IIIA, http://e-
institutor.iiia.csic.es/eide/pub. It is composed of a set of software tools that support all the stages of an
37
4. DESIGN OF MWATER PROTOTYPE #1
subsections describe the main components of the market institution. We will also use
the method published in [GB04a, GB06, GV09] in order to discover the computational
entities of mWater and their attributes.
4.1 Assumptions and definitions
We take a water right to be defined with four components: the type of use allowed by the
right, the location where the right is valid, the amount of water that may be drawn and the
time during which the right is valid. We assume that:
• Rights are owned by individuals or by entities with a legal identity (firms, associa-
tions or municipalities)
• There is a non-electronic market where an individual may acquire a water right
that is potentially tradable, and where an individual may either unburden himself or
become disentitled of a tradable right that might thereof disappear, be transformed
into new rights or become latent.
• A right becomes tradable only when a rightful owner registers the actual right and
its legal entitlement to it in the market.
• Only rightful owners, or properly entitled agents, may participate in the market.
• Software agents may be properly entitled to trade and their owners are liable for
their acts.
• A basin is representable as a directed graph whose nodes are places where water
may be extracted and edges indicate that one node receives water from another.
• A water right may be split into smaller water rights as long as the parts are rights in
themselves and are consistent with the original right.
• A water right may be used, and transferred, for any water use that has a priority
higher than the original.
• A water right may be transferred for a fixed time period after which it returns to its
original owner.
• A water right for a given location and use may be shared by two right owners who
split the volume of water used.
Electronic Institution (EI) engineering, namely: 1) ISLANDER, a tool for EI specification; 2) aBUILDER,
a tool to support the automatic generation of agent (code) skeletons from ISLANDER specifications of an
EI; 3) the AMELI middleware that handles the enactment of the institution; and 4) SIMDEI, a testing and
monitoring tool.
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• A water right may be traded face to face, under a closed bid auction or through a
conventional double auction.
• Rights may be put for sale or called for purchase with a deadline for the transaction
to take place.
• Once a right has been traded, the operation is subject to challenge for a fix period
of time.
4.2 The mWater proposal
Basin Authorities. Spain comprises nine Basin Authorities (Organismos de Cuenca)
attached to the Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs2. Each basin
authority plays an essential role in hydrologic planning, management of water resources
(uses and private rights), quality control and the design of new infrastructure. They would
affect directly a water rights market through the issuance of new rights, the suspension
and the annulment of existing rights and the possibility of modifying water use conditions.
They are also involved in the formalization and publication of transfer contracts and in
settling disputes over the signing of a transfer contract or its enactment. We would like to
include these roles in the mWater functionalities.
Basin Resources. The territorial component for water right exchanges in a basin is gen-
erally represented as geographical regions (with some orographic components like ele-
vation, soil types, vegetation and land use) with a network of rivers, a number of basin-
specific water sources and fountainheads, transport infrastructure like dams, canals and
pumping stations, and administrative jurisdiction. We will start with a simplification of
the territorial component by abstracting the system as a directed weighted graph. Each
node representing a location where water may be used and the volume of water that is
available in that location (and therefore subject to entitlement and transfer of a water
right), links representing transport conditions (capacity, cost, ownership) between nodes.
Decomposable water rights. Although current legislation already states some compo-
nents of a water right, we will introduce an enriched definition that is compatible with the
current one but adds flexibility to the trading of rights. Thus we define a right through
the place where water is drawned, the basin district where the source is located, the maxi-
mum amount of authorized extraction, the type of use allowed for the water and the period
during which the right is valid. Additionally we will allow to split water rights into sub-
rights and also to assemble new (single) rights from existing ones, regulating how these
operations may be achieved in a coherent way.
2http://www.marm.es
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Multiple trading modalities. Currently there is no standard trading mechanism for wa-
ter rights. Therefore, we will take inspiration from the legislation on water banks and
include many price-fixing mechanism, from standard double auction exchanges to facili-
tated many-to-many negotiation.
Creation, suspension and annulment of rights. So that the market may be expanded
or contracted by basin and state authorities both in a temporary or exceptional situation, or
in a more permanent or generic way. We want to enable the possibility of acquiring grants
without prior property of land and the possibility of upgrading or downgrading water use
requirements through negotiation among users and with authorities.
Full right transfer cycle. We want to do justice to the complexity of the transferring
of water rights and will include creation, negotiation of agreements, signing of contracts,
contract enactment, contract termination and grievances.
ODR-prone features. In particular we want to facilitate the use of agent-based re-
sources to deal with most of the activities associated with the market and, in particular, we
want to facilitate contract negotiation and fulfillment through appropriate on-line dispute
resolution devices. Similarly for grievances from affected third parties.
4.3 AN ISLANDER specification
4.3.1 Dialogical Framework
Roles
There are three main roles in the virtual water market. Firstly, a Guest role is a user that
wants to enter the mWater. The Guest may be specialized into a Water User, a water right-
holder of the basin, and furthermore as a Buyer, Seller and as (an affected) Third party.
Secondly, there are two governing roles involved in grievances and contract validation
processes: Basin authority and Referee. Thirdly, the Market Facilitator role represents
those institutional agents who run standard trading activities, for example set up a trading
table or mediate in a face-to-face negotiation.
Illocutory particles
Accept. The sender communicates the receiver the requested action is going to be carried
out. This is particularly useful in the accreditation process of the water right.
Inform. The sender informs the receiver the communicated message is truthful.
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Query. The sender asks the receiver for some particular information.
Refuse. The sender communicates the receiver the requested action is not going to be
carried out. This is particularly useful in the accreditation process of the water
right.
Request. The sender requests the receiver to carry out a particular action. The content of
the message comprises a description of the action to be done.
Functions
Next, we define the functions to be used in the scenes of our framework. We include a
description of each function and the scene/s where it is used in brackets.
auctionSuccessful(): all the members participating in the blind double auction have been
matched with another member, thus making an agreement between them, and ev-
eryone at the same price, which has converged to the market (real) price. [Blind
Double Auction scene]
bid(): a buyer informs the market facilitator (s)he bids for the current price and object in
an auction. [Dutch & English Auctions scenes]
close(): the current scene is terminated. [Nearly all the scenes]
contractEnactment(Contract c): the basin authority enacts a contract that will be neces-
sarily signed by both the seller and the buyer. [Contract Enactment scene]
dutchInfo(float price, float minPrice, time waitTime): the seller provides the market fa-
cilitator the parameters required to start a Dutch auction: initial price, minimum
price and wait time between rounds. [Dutch Auction scene]
endow(waterRight w): a water user requests the endowment of a free water right. [Enti-
tlement scene]
englishInfo(float price, time timeout): the seller provides the market facilitator the pa-
rameters required to start an English Auction: the initial price and the length of the
timeout, for declaring the auction end. [English Auction scene]
finished(): the sender notifies that has finished exposing a list of arguments. [Hearing
Dispute scene]
grievId(integer id): the market facilitator informs an agent about the performative struc-
ture’s identifier of the grievance process where that agent must go. [Ongoing Agree-
ments scene]
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grievStart(agent a): a plaintiff requests the market facilitator to start a new grievance
process, and notify the given agent that (s)he must attend the process as an affected
party. [Ongoing Agreements scene]
inviteToRoom(integer id, string parameters): the market facilitator invites one or several
agents to join an open negotiation process, with a predefined parameters, but only
when the receivers meet the invitation criteria. [Recruiting scene]
juryCall(integer id): the jury is called by the market facilitator to mediate in a dispute.
The parameter is the dispute identifier. [Jury Room scene]
listAgreements(Agreement *list): the market facilitator returns a list of the current agree-
ments active in the market to the water user who requests such information, so the
user may determine if (s)he is involved in any of them, and then initiate a grievance
procedure. [Ongoing Agreements scene]
listRights(waterRight *list): the market facilitator returns a list of the currently available
water rights of the market, so a new user may request an endowment of any of them.
[Entitlement scene]
listTrades(string *list): the market facilitator responds to a request made by a water user
who wants to be informed of the currently open negotiations. This call is preceded
by a queryTrades() invocation. [Open Trades scene]
matchDetails(agreement agr): the negotiation table manager informs the agent about
the agreement that was just created in the double auction, so the agent may finally
know who is the other agent (s)he will trade the water with. [Blind Double Auction
scene]
matched(): the negotiation table manager informs a participant in the blind double auc-
tion that his/her bid has been matched with another agent bid. Thus, the agent will
not need to make a counteroffer. [Blind Double Auction scene]
newArgument(string arg): an agent provides new information on a dispute where (s)he is
participating (wether as a plaintiff or an affected). [Grievance Protocol & Hearing
Dispute scenes]
newSituation(string situation): the market facilitator informs all the water users in the
market about an anomalous situation that affects the regular behavior of the market.
[Critical Situations scene]
offer(float price): the market facilitator broadcasts the current offer to the present traders
of the auction. [Dutch & English Auction scenes] —The water user participating in
the Blind Double Auction makes a new offer in this round. [Blind Double Auction
scene]
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publishVeredict(string verdict): a member of the jury, speaking in representation of the
all the jury, pronounces the final decision about the current dispute after hearing
both parts arguments. [Hearing Dispute scene]
queryAgreements(): a water user requests to the market facilitator a list of the current ac-
tive agreements. A listAgreements call will answer this demand. [Ongoing Agree-
ments scene]
queryRights(): a water user requests to the market facilitator a list of the currently avail-
able water rights of the market. A listRights call will reply this demand. [Entitle-
ment scene]
queryTrades(): a water user requests the market facilitator a list of the currently open
negotiations in the market. This call is followed by listTrades. [Open Trades scene]
regRight(waterRight w): a water user requests to the basin authority the registration of
a new water right in the market. [Entitlement scene] —A water user proves his/her
intention to trade with the specified water right. [Accreditation scene]
restart(): ff after several counteroffers all the participants of the blind double auction are
not matched, the round is restarted with this call and all the members must make a
new offer. [Blind Double Auction scene]
sanction(string sctn): a member of the jury communicates the affected agent the sanction
to be applied for a given dispute. The agent will then have to accept the sanction.
[Sanctioning Offenses scene]
start(): the current scene is initiated. [Nearly all scenes]
startAuction(item i, float price, time waitTime): the market facilitator broadcasts the
properties of the auction that just started, providing the item, its starting price and
the maximum time between rounds. [Dutch & English Auctions scenes]
startDoubleAuction(item i, date d): the negotiation table manager declares the current
auction started, and informs the agents of its parameters: the item that is going to
be traded, and the timeout. [Blind Double Auction scene]
tableId(integer id): the market facilitator responds a request to start a new negotiation
table with this call, providing the identifier of the newly created table. [Registration
& Registering scenes]
tableReqEntry(string *list): a buyer or a seller requests to enter a negotiation table. The
negotiation table manager will accept or decline this request, and in the last case,
the manager will provide a list of reasons. [Registration scene]
tableStart(string p): a water user requests the creation of a new negotiation table that fits
the properties provided. The market facilitator will invite the water users that fulfill
the recruiting criteria. [Recruiting scene]
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v fail(string issue, string *list): the market facilitator notifies a water user of a failure of
the prerequisites on a given issue and, if necessary, will provide a list of reasons to
do so. [Validation, Agreement Validation & Annulment scenes]
v ok(string issue): the market facilitator accepts or confirms an issue to a water user.
[Validation, Agreement Validation & Annulment scenes]
validateAgr(agreement a): the involved parties in the agreement (buyer and seller) re-
quest the basin authority to validate the provided agreement. [Validation, Agree-
ment Validation & Annulment scenes]
Ontological components
The following entities are the basis for the domain ontology:
Basin. A basin is a directed graph Λ = 〈N,E〉, where N = {ni : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} is a set
of places where water may be extracted, E = {〈ni, nj〉 : ni, nj ∈ N ∧ i 6= j}, is a
set of edges, where a tuple 〈ni, nj〉 ∈ E indicates that node nj receives water from
ni by means of a transportation resource (river or canal). Λ can be unconnected,
whenever a node is an isolated well or there are unconnected clusters in Λ.
Water-right. A water-right is a tuple ω = 〈λ, u, v, t〉, where λ (subgraph of Λ) is the
basin locations where the water-right can be executed (at least one node in λ must
be a water source node); u is the usage allowed; v represents the maximum quantity
of water allowed to be extracted there; and t is the time interval during which the
water-right may be executed.
Water-right bid. A water-right bid is defined as the tuple β = 〈o, ω, t, tβ〉, where the
bid-type o can take a Put label to represent a bid to sell, or a Call for a bid to buy;
ω is the water-right associated with a bid t is the time interval during which the
water-right would be used; tβ is the deadline of the bid.
Agreement. An agreement is a tuple α = 〈s, b, ω′, p, d, st〉, where s is the seller of the
right; b is the buyer; ω′ is the new water-right derived from the agreement negotia-
tion (this water-right will be granted to the buyer by means of a contract); p is the
agreed economic compensation; d is the agreement date;
st ∈ {Public, Contested, Authorized, Suspended} represents the current stage
of its life-cycle3.
3Possible stages are: Public, when it is registered by the buyer and seller and it is waiting for the Basin
Authorities endorsement; Contested, when it is contested by a third party who claims his rights are affected
by the agreement; Authorized, by the Basin Authorities; Suspended, by the Basin Authorities due to an
exceptional drought situation or a misuse of the transfer; Valid, the water-right transfer is being executed;
Done the water-right transfer was executed and the time-period has expired.
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Figure 4.1: mWater performative structure
Contract. A contract is the signed agreement among the contracting parties. It is defined
by the tuple κ = 〈A,K,U, d,O,C〉, where A is the set of related agreements (a
set of multiple water transfer agreements may be signed in a single contract); K
is the set of related sub-contracts, for example transportation resource contracts (if
there is no related sub-contracts it is an empty set); U is the set of users that sign
the contract; d is the agreement date; O is the set of observation commitments to
execute the contract; C is the set of conditions for conflict resolution.
4.3.2 Performative Structure
In this section the different performative structures of mWater will be detailed.
mWPS
mWater is a nested performative structure. The top one, mWaterPS, (Fig. 4.1) describes
the overall market. It includes three other performative structures, TradingHallPS, Trad-
ingTablesPS and GrievancesPS that, to provide more design flexibility, expand the Trad-
ingHall, TradingTables and Grievances processes (nodes) of wWaterPS, respectively.
Let’s first look into mWaterPS. Recall that only bona fide right-holders may trade
water rights in the market. So, in order to start the market there needs to be a process
through which an individual proves to the market that he is the rightful holder of a given
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water right and thus entitled to trade it. How does one become a rightful owner of a right?
How does a rightful owner of a right enters the market? These two processes are dealt
with in the entitlement and the accreditation scenes, respectively, discussed below. In
both cases, there must be some legal document that proves that a potential trader is in fact
entitled to trade that right. This process is carried out in the entitlement scene of mWater
whose goals are:
1. To enable someone to trade a right that it proves to be legally entitled to trade.
2. To endow someone with the entitlement to trade a particular right (because of newly
created, annulled or suspended rights become tradeable).
The accreditation scene, in turn, makes it possible to ”jump start” a market (different
basins may have their own mWater markets but certain preconditions —like a minimum
number of rights and accredited right-holders, special emergency or drought situations,
etc.— need to be fulfilled before the market becomes active). Once a market is open, this
scene allows legally entitled right-holders to enter and trade by registering their rights
and individual data for management and enforcement purposes. Staff have to validate
admission conventions and right-holder variables are given default variables.
TradingHall
Actual trading starts in this complex performative structure (see Fig. 4.2). Users and
trading staff can initiate most trading and ancillary operations from the Recruiting scene:
open, request trading parties and enter a trading table; query about different agreements
and initiate a grievance procedure from the Ongoing Agreements scene or, in the same
scene, get informed about a dispute in which the water user is affected. Right-holders
become aware of the market activity in the Open Trades scene, and get informed about
anomalous situations, for example severe drought situations, in the Critical Situations
scene. Members of the Jury may also be required to mediate in a dispute at the Jury Room
scene.
Technically speaking, all these scenes are “stay-and-go” scenes: while the users are
inside the market, they have to stay permanently in these scenes but they may also go (as
alteroids) to trading table scenes and contract enactment scenes where they are involved:
these scenes where user alteroids become involved are created (as a new instance of the
corresponding performative structures) when a staff agent has a request from a user, an
authority, or because of a pre-established convention (like weekly auctions).
Trading Table
In our mWater performative structure (recall Fig. 4.1), a market facilitator can open a new
trading table whenever a new auction period starts or whenever a right-holder requests to
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Figure 4.2: TradingHall performative structure.
trade a right outside the auction hall. In such a case, a right-holder chooses a negotiation
protocol from a set of available ones (e.g., face to face negotiation, closed bids, standard
double auction exchange or any others that are agreed upon). Consequently, in order to
accommodate different trading mechanisms, we assemble the TradingTable performative
structure as a list of different scenes, each corresponding to a valid trading mechanism or
negotiation protocol. Each instance of a Trading Table scene is managed by a Negotiation
Table Manager, tm, who knows the structure, specific data and management protocol of
the given negotiation protocol. Among other negotiation mechanisms, we have included
face-to-face, Dutch auction, English auction, standard double auction and blind double
auction with mediator negotiation. Nevertheless, new negotiation protocols may be easily
added providing that the new protocol definition complies with the generic structure.
Every generic negotiation table is defined as a three-scene performative structure (see
Fig. 4.3). The first scene is Registration, in which the tm applies a filtering process to
assure that only valid water users can enter a given trading table (recall situations when
a private trading table is executing or only a sub-group of water users that fulfill a set of
constraints may participate in the table). The specific filtering process will depend on the
given negotiation protocol and possibly on domain specific features. The second scene
is the negotiation protocol itself, in which the set of steps of the given protocol are spec-
ified. Finally, in the last scene, Validation, a set of closing activities are executed, for
example registering the final deals, stating the following steps for the agreement settle-
ment, verifying that the party that leaves the table satisfies the exit norms of the trading
table, etc.
Notice in mWaterPS that ”Trading Tables” is a ”new” transition because staff will
open a new trading table whenever a new auction period starts and whenever a right-
holder requests to trade a right outside the auction hall.
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Figure 4.3: Performative structure for different trading procedures: TradingTables.
Grievances
Once an agreement is active, it may be executed by the new right-holder and, conse-
quently, other right-holders and some external stakeholders may initiate a grievance pro-
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Figure 4.4: Performative structure of the process to manage a grievance procedure.
cedure (see Fig. 4.4) that may overturn or modify the transfer agreement. Even if there
are no grievances that modify a contract, parties might not fulfill the contract properly
and there might be some contract reparation actions. If things proceed smoothly, the right
subsists until maturity.
Conflicts are managed in a three step process. In the first step, any water user may
initiate a grievance process in which (s)he presents claims and arguments. The complaints
are evaluated by the market authority and if deemed relevant may then proceed to the
second step, where the mWater staff informs the affected parties of the dispute in order
to execute their rights to appeal. A jury and/or a referee hears the dispute among the
parties and determines the outcome. Finally, in the third step, the Jury issues the sentence
informing the parties and imposing sanction to transgressors, if any.
4.3.3 mWater scenes
Entitlement
Only bona fide right-holders may trade water rights in the market and there are only
two ways of becoming the owner of a right. The former happens when an existing right
is legally acquired from its previous owner outside of mWater (through inheritance or
pecuniary compensation for example). The latter happens when a new right is created by
the mWater authorities and an eligible holder claims it and gets it granted. This scene
gives access to the market to new right holders who prove they are entitled to trade. It is
also used to bootstrap the market.
In the Entitlement scene (Figure 4.5), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W6, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. From here, water users may send requests to the
market facilitator, as well as enter or leave the process.
• W3: a water user requests a list of the tradeable water rights in the market, and he
is waiting for the market facilitator to respond to the query.
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Figure 4.5: Scene protocol to become the owner of a right: Entitlement
• W4: in this case, a water user has requested to be endowed with a tradeable water
right.
• W5: this state is the result of a water user requesting to register a new water right
in the market.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: request (?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (queryRights)
• W3 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (listRights ?list)
• W2 - W4: request (?w WatrUsr) (?ba BasinAuth) (endow ?right)
• W4 - W2: refuse (!ba BasinAuth) (!w WatrUsr) (endow !right)
• W4 - W2: accept (!ba BasinAuth) (!w WatrUsr) (endow !right)
• W2 - W5: request (?w WatrUsr) (!ba BasinAuth) (regRight ?right)
• W5 - W2: refuse (!ba BasinAuth) (!w WatrUsr) (regRight !right)
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Figure 4.6: Scene protocol to prove the intention to trade: Accreditation
• W5 - W2: accept (!ba BasinAuth) (!w WatrUsr) (regRight !right)
• W2 - W6: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Accreditation
This scene allows legally entitled right-holders to enter the market and trade by registering
their rights and individual data for management and enforcement purposes. Staff have to
validate admission conventions and right-holder variables are given default values. When
a right suspension is overridden or an agreement is void, rightful owners need to register
again.
In the Accreditation scene (Figure 4.6), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. From here, water users may send requests to the
market facilitator, as well as enter or leave the process.
• W3: a water user has requested to introduce one of his water rights into the market,
thus declaring its intention to trade it.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all WatrUsr) (start)
• W2 - W3: request(?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (regRight ?right)
• W3 - W2: refuse (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (regRight !right)
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Figure 4.7: Scene protocol to create and be notified of negotiation tables: Recruiting
• W3 - W2: accept (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (regRight !right)
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Recruiting
As well as in Entitlement, there will be just one Recruiting scene for all the Electronic
Institution. Users may request the market facilitator a new negotiation table, as well as
receive invitations to other tables created by other users or by the market facilitator itself.
In the Recruiting scene (Figure 4.7), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Water users may request new negotiation tables,
and may be notified from new tables that may interest them. They may as well enter
or leave the scene.
• W3: the current state will be W3 after a water user requests a new negotiation table,
and waits for the market facilitator to create it.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W2: inform(!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (inviteToRoom ?id ?info)
• W2 - W2: inform(!m MrktFacilit) (?w WatrUsr) (inviteToRoom ?id ?info)
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• W2 - W3: request (?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (tableStart ?properties)
• W3 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (tableId !id)
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Ongoing Agreements
There will be just one Ongoing Agreements scene for all the Electronic Institution. In this
scene, a water user may perform two main actions. The first is to be informed of the cur-
rent active Agreements in the market, so the water user may know if he is affected by any
of them. If he is, then he may start a grievance procedure (the second action). A grievance
procedure may be as well invoked by different reasons, not just due to agreements.
In the Ongoing Agreements scene (Figure 4.8), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W5, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Water users may request a list of active agreements,
as well as start a grievance procedure from here.
• W3: a water user has requested the market facilitator a new dispute room. The
market facilitator will respond with the identifier of the room.
• W4: after requesting a list of the currently active agreements, a water user waits for
the market facilitator to prepare the list.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W2: request (!m MrktFacilit) (?w WatrUsr) (grievId ?id)
• W2 - W3: request(?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (grievStart ?affected)
• W3 - W2: inform(!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (grievId ?id)
• W2 - W4: request(?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (queryAgreements)
• W4 - W2: inform(!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (listAgreements ?list)
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
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Figure 4.8: Scene protocol to start grievance procedures and be informed of active agree-
ments: Ongoing Agreements
Open Trades
Water users will be able to stay updated of the open negotiation tables, where they may
join, in this scene.
In the Open Trades scene (Figure 4.9), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Water users may join or leave the scene in this
state.
• W3: a water user requested a list of the trading tables where he may join. The
market facilitator will respond to the query with a list of the tables.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: request(?w WatrUsr) (!m MrktFacilit) (queryTrades)
• W3 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (?w WatrUsr) (listTrades ?list)
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Figure 4.10: Scene protocol to inform the whole market about anomalous situations:
Critical Situations
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Critical Situations
The objective of this scene is to have an open communication channel about situations
that may change the behavior of the market.
In the Critical Situations scene (Figure 4.10), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W3, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Water users may join or leave the scene in this
state.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
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Figure 4.11: Scene protocol to make a call for the jury: Jury Room
• W3 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (newSituation ?event)
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Jury Room
The objective of this scene is to be able to communicate with the jury in a private way,
and to be able to require its presence in any dispute.
In the Jury Room scene (Figure 4.11), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W3, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Jury members may join or leave the scene. The
jury will be called from this state if it is required.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all Jury) (juryCall ?roomId)
• W2 - W3: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Registration
A water user that may show interest in joining a negotiation table has to proof that he
fulfills the table selection criteria. This will be done in the Registration scene.
In the Registration scene (Figure 4.12), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Buyers and sellers may join and/or leave in this
scene.
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Figure 4.12: Scene protocol to gain access to a negotiation table: Registration
• W3: a buyer or seller has requested to join the negotiation table to the table man-
ager. After checking if the requirements are met, the negotiation table manager will
accept or decline the request.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform(?t TblMngr) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: request(?b Buyer) (!t TblMngr) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W2 - W3: request(?s Seller) (!t TblMngr) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W3 - W2: accept (!t TblMngr) (?b Buyer) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W3 - W2: decline (!t TblMngr) (?b Buyer) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W3 - W2: accept (!t TblMngr) (?s Seller) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W3 - W2: decline (!t TblMngr) (?s Seller) (tableReqEntry ?x)
• W2 - W4: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
Dutch auction
This is one of the possible negotiation protocols that a buyer and a seller may choose to
trade water.
In the Dutch auction scene (Figure 4.13), apart from the initial and final states (W1
and W6, respectively), we can find the following:
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Figure 4.13: Scene protocol: Dutch auction
• W2: the vendor has sent the table manager all the information required to start the
auction, and they both are waiting for a minimum number of buyers to start the
auction.
• W3: the auction is running, and there is a defined price for the auctioned item.
Buyers can bid the actual price at this point.
• W4: no buyer has placed a bid, therefore the item price will be decreased by a
percentage of its initial price.
• W5: a buyer placed a bid for the actual price, so the table manager will check the
buyer’s credit and decide wether to accept or to refuse the bid.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?s Seller) (?t TblMngr) (dutchInfo ?price ?minPrice ?waitTime)
• W2 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (all Buyer) (startAuction ?item !price !waitTime)
• W3 - W4: [!waitTime]
• W3 - W5: inform (?b Buyer) (!t TblMngr) (bid)
• W4 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (all Buyer) (offer ?price)
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• W4 - W6: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
• W5 - W3: refuse (!t TblMngr) (!b Buyer) (bid)
• W5 - W6: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) ?sale:Agreement
English Auction
Another possible negotiation protocol that a buyer and a seller may choose to trade water.
In the English auction scene (Figure 4.14), apart from the initial and final states (W1
and W6, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the vendor has sent the table manager all the information required to start the
auction, and they both are waiting for a minimum number of buyers to start the
auction.
• W3: the auction is running, and there is a defined price for the auctioned item.
Buyers can bid the actual price at this point.
• W4: the wait time has passed and no buyer has placed a bid, so the auction finishes.
• W5: a buyer placed a bid for the actual price, so the table manager will check the
buyer’s credit and decide wether to accept or to refuse the bid.
• W6: if the bid is accepted, the price should be updated. If not, the price remains the
same.
• W7: buyers may place a new bid in this state.
• W8: if the waiting time passes and no new bids are placed, the buyer with the
current highest bid wins the auction, and therefore a new agreement is established
between buyer and seller on the auctioned item.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?s Seller) (?t TblMngr) (englishInfo ?price ?waitTime)
• W2 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (all Buyer) (startAuction ?item !price !timeout)
• W3 - W4: [!timeout]
• W3 - W5: inform (?b Buyer) (!t TblMngr) (bid)
• W4 - W9: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
• W5 - W6: accept (!t TblMngr) (?winner Buyer) (bid)
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Figure 4.14: Scene protocol: English auction
• W5 - W7: refuse (!t TblMngr) (!b Buyer) (bid)
• W6 - W7: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (offer ?price)
• W7 - W5: inform (?b Buyer) (!t TblMngr) (bid)
• W7 - W8: [!timeout]
• W8 - W9: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) ?sale:Agreement
Blind Double Auction
Another possible negotiation protocol that a buyer and a seller may choose to trade water.
In the Blind Double auction scene (Figure 4.15), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the main state of the scene. Buyers and sellers must place their offers in this
state, and the table manager will match them as they reach an agreed price. Once
everyone of them have placed a bid, the table manager will communicate the bidders
if their offers were successful or not.
• W3: if all the participants of the auction match their prices, the auction succeeds.
In this state, the table manager informs buyers and sellers about the agreements and
who will be the other trader.
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Figure 4.15: Scene protocol: Blind Double auction
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (startDoubleAuction ?item ?timeout)
• W1 - W4: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
• W2 - W2: inform (?x all) (!t TblMngr) (offer ?price)
• W2 - W2: inform (?x all) (!t TblMngr) (offer ?price)
• W2 - W2: inform (!t TblMngr) (?x all) (matched)
• W2 - W2: refuse (!t TblMngr) (?x all) (offer ?price)
• W2 - W2: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (restart)
• W2 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (auctionSuccesfull)
• W2 - W4: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
• W3 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (?x Buyer) (matchDetails ?agreement)
• W3 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (?x Seller) (matchDetails ?agreement)
• W3 - W4: inform (!t TblMngr) (all all) (close)
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Figure 4.16: Scene protocol to conclude a negotiation: Validation
Validation
In the validation scene, a set of closing activities are executed, for example registering the
final deals, stating the following steps for the agreement settlement, etc.
In the Validation scene (Figure 4.16), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W3, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: after the seller presents the corresponding agreement, the table manager has to
confirm its validity refereing to the used negotiation protocol.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: request(?s Seller) (?t TblMngr) (validateAgr ?agreement)
• W2 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (!s Seller) (v ok ?message)
• W2 - W3: inform (!t TblMngr) (!s Seller) (v fail ?message ?reason)
Agreement Validation
Once an agreement on transferring a water right has been reached it is managed according
to the market conventions. mWater staff check whether or not the agreement satisfies
formal conditions and the hydrological plan normative conventions.
In the Agreement Validation scene (Figure 4.17), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: after the seller presents the corresponding agreement, the basin authority has
to confirm its correspondence with the Basin Hydrological Plan (BHP).
• W3: if the agreement satisfies the BHP, the basin authority must check the agree-
ment also satisfies the National Hydrological Plan.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: request(?b Buyer) (?ba BasinAuth) (validateAgr ?agreement)
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Figure 4.17: Scene protocol to check normative conventions: Agreement Validation
• W1 - W2: request(?s Seller) (?ba BasinAuth) (validateAgr ?agreement)
• W2 - W3: inform (!ba BasinAuth) (all all) (v ok ?message)
• W2 - W4: inform (!ba BasinAuth) (all all) (v fail ?message ?reason)
• W3 - W4: inform (!ba BasinAuth) (all all) (v ok ?message)
• W3 - W4: inform (!ba BasinAuth) (all all) (v fail ?message ?reason)
Contract Enactment
In this scene, a transfer contract is agreed upon and signed by the parties involved in the
previous Agreement Validation scene, and then the agreement becomes active.
In the Contract Enactment scene (Figure 4.18), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W5, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: according to the national laws, before signing contract a period of 30 days
must be granted, so any third party may present a grievance in case it is necessary.
After that period passes,
• W3: the basin authority has presented the contract to both parties..
• W4: the seller has signed the contract. Now the buyer will proceed to sign.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
AT/2008/D8.2.1/v0.7 December 03, 2009 63

















Figure 4.18: Scene protocol to sign a transfer contract and make it active: Contract En-
actment
• W1 - W2: inform (?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: inform (?ba BasinAuth) (all all) (contractEnactment ?contract)
• W2 - W5: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
• W3 - W4: accept (?s Seller) (all all) (contractEnactment ?contract)
• W4 - W5: accept (?b Buyer) (all all) (contractEnactment ?contract)
Grievance Protocol
Any water user may initiate a grievance process in which (s)he exposes his/her arguments.
In the Grievance scene (Figure 4.19), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the plaintiff may give new arguments to start a grievance procedure, or may
finish its turn.
• W3: the plaintiff added a new argument, and the market facilitator will now con-
sider it valid or not to start a new grievance process.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: request (?p Plaintiff) (!m MrktFacilit) (newArgument ?message)
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Figure 4.19: Scene protocol to expose the arguments for a grievance procedure:
Grievance Protocol
• W2 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
• W3 - W2: accept (!m MrktFacilit) (!p Plaintiff) (newArgument !message)
• W3 - W2: refuse (!m MrktFacilit) (!p Plaintiff) (newArgument !message)
Hearing Dispute
The market facilitator informs the affected parties of the dispute in order to execute their
rights to appeal. A jury hears the dispute among the parties and determines the offenses.
In the Hearing Dispute scene (Figure 4.20), apart from the initial and final states (W1
and W5, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: when all the required parties are present in the scene, the market facilitator
commences the scene. From here, a plaintiff may present new charges or finish the
dispute and wait for the jury verdict.
• W3: the plaintiff presented a new argument, and the affected may now present its
own arguments to defend him/herself.
• W4: the plaintiff concluded the exposition of arguments. The jury will now present
the conclusions.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
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Figure 4.20: Scene protocol to expose the arguments about the dispute: Hearing Dispute
• W1 - W2: inform (?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
• W2 - W3: inform (?p Plaintiff) (all all) (newArgument ?charges)
• W2 - W4: inform (!p Plaintiff) (all all) (finished)
• W3 - W2: inform (?a Affected) (all all) (finished)
• W3 - W3: inform (?a Affected) (all all) (newArgument ?charges)
• W4 - W5: inform (?j Jury) (all all) (publicVeredict ?veredict)
Sanctioning Offenses
In this scene, the third step, the Jury issues the sentence informing the parties the sanction.
In the Sanctioning Offenses scene (Figure 4.21), apart from the initial and final states
(W1 and W4, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: this is the main state in the scene. Once the jury and the affected party are
present in the scene, the market facilitator commences the sanctioning process.
From here, the jury will expose the sanctions.
• W3: the jury has exposed a sanction, and the affected party is required to accept it,
as a proof to follow the market rules and conventions.
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?m MrktFacilit) (all all) (start)
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Figure 4.21: Scene protocol to issue the sanctions to the affected parties: Sanctioning
Offenses
• W2 - W3: inform (?j Jury) (all all) (sanction ?desc)
• W2 - W4: inform (?a Affected) (all all) (sanction !desc)
• W3 - W2: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (all all) (close)
Annulment
This scene allows water users to quit the water market, assuring they have no unresolved
issues, like pending sanctions, active agreements, or making sure they are not present in
any negotiations or grievance procedures.
In the Annulment scene (Figure 4.22), apart from the initial and final states (W1 and
W6, respectively), we can find the following:
• W2: the water user has requested his/her cease in the water market.
• W3: the water user has no pending sanctions.
• W4: the water user has no active agreements.
• W5: the water user is not present in any negotiations.
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Figure 4.22: Scene protocol to log out from the water market institution: Annulment
The allowed messages to flow among the states are the following:
• W1 - W2: inform (?w WatrUsr) (?m MrktFacilit) (start)
• W2 - W3: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (v ok ?message)
• W3 - W4: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (v ok ?message)
• W4 - W5: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (v ok ?message)
• W5 - W6: inform (!m MrktFacilit) (!w WatrUsr) (v ok ?message)
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Works
As a whole, mWater constitutes a rather complex regulated open multi-agent system. It is
designed with three objectives in mind. First, as a demonstrator in the AT project, it should
provide a testing environment and inspiring problem domain for conceptual proposals and
tools. Second, it may be used as the demand component of a sophisticated basin model
to visualize and explore water management policies. That is, to explore the interactions
between the basin hydrographic resources and infrastructures and the use of water as it
is being modulated by market mechanisms and policy directives and regulations. Third,
given the possibility of the creation of an actual market for water rights or analogous
public goods, mWater would be a first proof of concept version to build upon.
The work we report in this deliverable provides the problem specification, and the
analysis and design of the institutional framework for mWater prototype #1. We are now
developing a richer electronic institution where scenes of the trading tables and the agree-
ment management performative structures will be tailored to the two sources of inspira-
tion of the demonstrator: i) to interaction conventions that are interesting for the testing of
ideas developed in other work packages of the AT project, and ii) to interaction conven-
tions that correspond to current practices and legislation. In this process we also improve
the social structure of the framework to include specific staff roles for trading and conflict
resolution mechanisms, auctioneers, arbiters, mediators, facilitators; as well as collective
actors. Evidently, the ontology will need to be enriched and we shall begin to deal with
the problems of anchoring dialogical terms (i.e. establishing the pragmatics of constants
and relations in the communication language).
We have been able to delay the specification of software agents because we may use
a human interface that is possible to build automatically from the specification by the
aBUILDER tool. We will now start programming staff agents to manage the trading hall,
different trading tables and a couple of on-line-dispute-resolution mechanisms, and pass
our specifications out to other teams of the AT project so that they can use the demonstra-
tor to test their agent architectures.
Our current mWater implementation reflects institutional normative requirements in
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different ways through the standard EI constructs. Some non-procedural conventions are
reflected in the dialogical framework. Some others are reflected as variable constraints or
pre- and post-conditions of speech acts in the specification of scenes. Still some more in
the decisional models of internal (staff) agents. We now want to incorporate declarative
regulations as part of the scene specifications. This is possible thanks to recent extensions
to the EIDE platform that couple an inference engine to the AMELI middleware, along
the lines suggested in [GCNRA05].
An important effort in line with the tasks just outlined, is the compilation of conven-
tional regulatory elements that affect water: legislation, local regulations and traditional
social practices. One opportunity that we find specially attractive is the study of conflict-
related social practices in the La Mancha Oriental basin.
The emphasis on regulatory aspects mentioned in the three last paragraphs is moti-
vated by the fact that the main objective policy-makers have is to achieve the adequate
behavior of user. And regulation is the main tool that policy-makers have to modify be-
havior. However, in practice, users are prone to achieve “order without law” [Ell91], or
at least to keep on adapting to regulations in order to preserve their successful practices
while policy-makers keep on adapting regulations to guide users in a constantly changing
environmental and political media. Thus, our demonstrator should provide the founda-
tions for the study of that interplay.
The mWater version presented in previous chapters is intended as the institutional
foundation for further developments along the three modes of potential use of the MAS we
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Although our immediate efforts concentrate
on the test-bed conventions and functionalities, we will be keeping an open disposition
towards the policy-simulation requirements. Thus, in future versions we will be including
those functionalities that might be worth having in a policy-simulation environment —at
the pace and depth the AT agenda indicates— but, for the time being, we neither intend
to add simulation capabilities beyond those already available in SIMDEI and in the EIDE
simulation service extensions (cf. [ANRAS07]), nor to merge mWater with conventional
basin models. With respect to the market prototype, our strategy is to manage it as a
by-product of the test-bed and simulation developments until the need or opportunity for
an actual product arises. The reason is that we are building the mWater test-bed around
a realistic institutional core with multiple functional add-ons that may be readily adapted
to eventual regulations on the one hand, and market-design and testing requirements, on
the other.
Apart from the previous ongoing works we can identify the following 2010 activities
for Task 8.2:
• Specification of software agents for water users of the La Mancha Oriental basin.
• Working meetings with WP members of WP2, WP3 and WP4 in order to integrate
results from these groups and to define possible inspiring domains for conceptual
proposals and tools.
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• A first implementation of mWater #1, which will include the performative structures
and scenes identified in Chapter 4.
• Meetings with the mWater advisory board in order to evaluate prototype # 1 with
experts of water related problems.
• Analysis and Design of mWater prototype #2, which will address Scenario #2 de-
scribed in Chapter 3.
Contributing publications
The work of this package has contributed the state of the art with the following publica-
tions:
• V. Botti, A. Garrido, A. Giret, F. Igual, and P. Noriega. On the design of mWater:
a case study for agreement technologies. In Proceedings of the 7th European
Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2009), 2009.
• V. Botti, A. Garrido, A. Giret, and P. Noriega. Managing water demand as a
regulated open MAS. In Proceedings of the MALLOW Workshop on Coordina-
tion, Organization, Institutions and Norms in agent systems in on-line communities
(COIN@MALLOW’09), pages 108–109, 2009.
• A. Garrido, A. Giret, and P. Noriega. mWater: a sandbox for agreement tech-
nologies. In Proceedings of the XII Congreso Catalán de Inteligencia Artificial
(CCIA’09), pages 252–261, 2009.
• V. Botti, A. Garrido, A. Giret, F. Igual, and P. Noriega. Managing water demand as
a regulated open MAS. Post Proceedings of the MALLOW Workshop on Coordina-
tion, Organization, Institutions and Norms in agent systems in on-line communities
(COIN@MALLOW’09), Submitted, 2010.
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